Graduated Consent in Contract and Tort Law: Toward A. Theory of Justification by Bell, Tom W.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 61 | Issue 1
2010
Graduated Consent in Contract and Tort Law:
Toward A. Theory of Justification
Tom W. Bell
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Tom W. Bell, Graduated Consent in Contract and Tort Law: Toward A. Theory of Justification, 61 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 17 (2010)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol61/iss1/7
 12/23/2010 10:52:26 AM 
  
17 
 
ARTICLES 
GRADUATED CONSENT IN CONTRACT 
AND TORT LAW: TOWARD A THEORY 
OF JUSTIFICATION 
Tom W. Bell† 
ABSTRACT 
We often speak of consent in binary terms, boiling it down to 
“yes” or “no.” In truth, however, consent varies by degrees. We tend 
to afford expressly consensual transactions more respect than 
transactions backed by only implied consent, for instance, which we 
in turn regard as more meaningful than transactions justified by 
merely hypothetical consent. A mirror of that ordinal ranking appears 
in our judgments about unconsensual transactions, too. Those 
gradations of consent mark a deep structure of our social world, one 
especially evident in the contours of contract and tort law. This 
article draws on those and other sources to outline a theory of 
graduated consent, one that establishes a standard for measuring the 
justification of a wide variety of human relationships. Though its 
basic tenets comfortably agree with everyday common sense, 
graduated-consent theory offers surprising answers to such old 
problem as enforcing standardized agreements, justifying political 
coercion, and discerning the meaning of a constitution. In those and 
other applications, graduated-consent theory promises to enrich our 
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understanding of contract and tort law, as well as other areas of 
legal, moral, and economic reasoning. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We often speak of consent in binary terms, boiling it down to 
―yes‖ or ―no.‖ That reflects one of the most fundamental features of 
social life, a phenomenon so widely observed as almost to escape 
mention: we generally smile on consensual transactions but frown on 
unconsensual ones. Unsurprisingly, given their common-law roots, 
the principles of contract and tort law reflect that same, deep structure 
of our world. Thus does contract law enforce express agreements, 
whereas tort law remedies unconsensual exchanges. Viewed in this 
low-resolution snapshot, consent exhibits a strictly binary, on-or-off 
nature. 
When we study it in more detail, however, examining how consent 
works in actual practice, we see that it ebbs and flows by degrees.
1
 
We tend to afford expressly consensual transactions more respect than 
those backed by only implied consent, for instance, which we in turn 
regard as more worthy of enforcement than transactions justified by 
mere hypothetical consent. A similar ordinal ranking—a mirror of our 
judgments about consensual transactions—surfaces in our judgments 
about unconsensual ones. In those, the characteristic concerns of 
contract and tort law, we see proof that consent varies by degrees and 
measures the justification of human relationships. Drawing on 
examples from the common law and other sources, we can frame a 
theory of graduated consent, one that offers a useful tool for legal, 
ethical, and economic reasoning. 
How does graduated consent work? Consider how it can explain 
the case of a delivery gone sorely amiss.
2
 Suppose that an expectant 
mother contracts with a hospital to receive medical care during her 
childbirth. Her express consent suffices to turn what might otherwise 
look like a case of battery—the impliedly unconsensual poking and 
prodding administered by nurses and doctors—into justifiable aid. 
About that basic sort of transaction, the common law and graduated-
consent theory agree. Let us complicate matters, though, by further 
supposing that this particular patient emphatically objects in advance 
to receiving an episiotomy, going so far as to cross out the procedure 
on the hospital‘s paperwork, but that the physician attending the birth, 
                                                                                                                 
1 That gap between how we speak and how we act probably reflects the still relatively 
under-theorized nature of consent. As Scott Anderson has observed, ―coercion is a matter of 
longstanding political and ethical concern. Nonetheless, there has been little sustained scholarly 
attention to its nature until recently; historically, many seem to have been willing to accept the 
concept of coercion as a primitive.‖ Scott Anderson, Coercion, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. 
(Feb. 10, 2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion. 
2 The basic facts and outcome—but not all the terminology and reasoning—come from 
Curtis v. Jaskey, 759 N.E.2d 962 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
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calculating that only an episiotomy can save the patient from a life-
threatening complication, performs the procedure. When the patient 
later sues for battery, the doctor responds that any reasonable person 
would have agreed to receive an episiotomy under such circumstances 
and that doctors such as himself customarily have authority to render 
emergency medical care. 
Should the physician thereby escape liability? Almost certainly 
not. The patient‘s express nonconsent to the episiotomy would 
presumptively (absent a showing of insanity or some other 
incapacitating factor) trump the merely hypothetical and implied 
consent on other side of the equation. As a common-law court would 
put it, ―[I]n the face of a clear refusal to submit to a medical 
procedure, the emergency exception is inapplicable.‖3 Graduated-
consent theory concurs, explaining that the case demonstrates how 
express unconsent outweighs hypothetical and implied consent, 
thereby rendering the transaction unjustified. By carefully defining 
those and related terms, and by describing how they interact to afford 
assessments of the justifiability of a wide range of social transactions, 
graduated-consent theory can both explain common-law precedents 
and extend their underlying reasoning to other contexts. 
This Article explains and demonstrates graduated-consent theory 
in three basic steps: first, it establishes consent‘s value; second, its 
qualities; and third, its utility as a means for evaluating and improving 
social life. Part I reviews the case for consent, illustrating the 
important role that consent plays in legal, moral, and economic 
reasoning. That is not to say that everyone everywhere ranks consent 
as the supreme good that should be pursued above all else. 
Nonetheless, we can trace consent‘s influence on the face of most 
legal, moral, and economic theories. That interesting discovery alone 
merits attention. Consent grows still more interesting when we also 
consider that most legal, moral, and economic theories treat it as a 
prima facie good, one that they subordinate to other, more important 
goals only in exceptional cases.
4
 
                                                                                                                 
3 Id. at 968. 
4 Thus, for instance, might an economist apologize for government regulation as 
medicine that, however distasteful, offers our best hope of remedying the shortcomings of civil 
society. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 389 (7th ed. 2007) 
(―Monopoly, pollution, fraud, mistake, mismanagement, and other unhappy by-products of the 
market are conventionally viewed as failures of the market‘s self-regulatory mechanisms and 
therefore as appropriate occasions for public regulation.‖). The market counts as one of many 
spontaneous and planned nonpolitical orders, albeit a very important one. Others include 
language, customs, and expressly consensual social cooperatives. Posner likewise includes more 
than just mere commerce in his description of market failure: But ―[t]his way of looking at the 
matter is misleading. The failure is ordinarily a failure of the market and of the rules of the 
market prescribed by the common law.‖ Id.  
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Part II describes the many gradations of consent and their order on 
a scale of justification. In the positive range, the scale runs from 
express consent, through implied consent, and down to hypothetical 
consent. Express consent bears more power to justify a transaction 
than either of those two lesser forms of consent can muster, while 
implied consent has more power to justify than merely hypothetical 
consent does. A similar ranking repeats, in reverse order, in 
justification‘s negative range. There, unconsent5 increases in the steps 
from hypothetical unconsent, through implied unconsent, down to 
express unconsent. (As discussed later in the article, closer scrutiny 
reveals even finer gradations in the scale of consent, allowing us to 
subdivide these types into subtypes.
6
) Each type of consent tends to 
have a particular power to justify social exchanges—whether it 
evokes from observers‘ affirmative support, respectful 
noninterference, skeptical disapproval, or forceful objection. Consent 
and justification thus come in degrees and vary in step, one with the 
other. Figure 1, below, illustrates. 
 
Figure 1: Types of Consent and Their Relationship to Justification 
 
Part III puts this theory of graduated consent to work, applying it 
to such puzzles as the enforceability of standardized agreements, the 
justification of political coercion, and the reading of a constitution. 
That effort generates some interesting results. It explains the 
weighing process that courts use in deciding whether to enforce a 
standard form agreement, while supported by proofs of express 
consent, bears marks of hypothetical, implied, and (after the fact) 
express unconsent. Looking at political justification through the lens 
                                                                                                                 
5 Here, ―unconsent‖ means, as the prefix ―un-‖ suggests, the negative of consent. This 
Article reserves ―nonconsent,‖ in contrast, to describe conditions in which consent may, far 
from suffering negation, simply play no role. See infra Part II.A.5. On that usage, battery would 
qualify as unconsensual, whereas objectionable weather would (absent extraordinary facts) 
qualify as simply nonconsensual. 
6 See infra Figure 3. 
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of graduated-consent theory reveals some trenchant criticisms of 
institutionalized coercion as well as some ways to render the United 
States more justified in taking action, such as increasing our freedom 
to exit certain government programs or instituting citizen courts. Thus 
might we, as good patriots, improve our country.
7
 
Relatedly, in the context of constitutional decision making, a 
theory of graduated consent suggests that we can maximize the 
justification of a constitution by reading it to maximize the consent of 
the governed. Meaning, among other things, that we should enforce a 
constitution as a court would enforce a standard form agreement 
drafted and offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by one powerful 
party to many various weak ones. We should try, in other words, to 
forget that it is a constitution we expound,
8
 and instead enforce it (or 
not) as we would any contract for the provision of governing services. 
Those and other conclusions, some of them quite surprising, 
follow from adopting a graduated view of consent. Though it may 
seem obvious in retrospect that consent varies by degrees and justifies 
social relations, that deep structural feature of legal, moral, and 
economic reasoning has hitherto escaped careful and sustained 
attention. Graduated-consent theory can thus help us both to 
understand old truths and to uncover new ones. 
I. WHY VALUE CONSENT? 
We value consent for many and good reasons. This Part explains 
the important role that consent plays in legal, moral, and economic 
reasoning. That is not to say that any field of thought takes consent as 
the sole or greatest value, however; consent comes in too many 
shades to submit to so gross a simplification. In law, morality, and 
economics alike, though, express consent represents a prima facie 
good and a measure of justification. Sections A, B, and C, below, 
explain consent‘s role in each discipline, respectively. 
A. The Legal Value of Consent 
Consent plays a very prominent role in the law—so much so that 
the point hardly needs elaboration. Various examples, scattered 
throughout this Article, drawn primarily from contract and tort law 
but also from the laws of agency and property, illustrate consent‘s 
overwhelming importance in common-law jurisprudence. The 
                                                                                                                 
7 I speak as a U.S. citizen, of course, but readers from elsewhere should find that my 
observations about patriotism apply equally well to their relationships with their own countries. 
8 But see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (―[W]e must never 
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.‖) (emphasis in original). 
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common law regards consent as a necessary ingredient for creating a 
binding contractual bargain, for instance.
9
 Thus, too, does tort law 
require a showing of unconsent before acting to remedy such wrongs 
as battery
10
 or trespass.
11
 That is not to say that the law simply treats 
consent as The Good. Contract and tort law instead treat consent as a 
prima facie good, one that comes with various caveats and in many 
shades. 
Especially in the law of contracts, consent has a carefully defined 
meaning. A court will typically look with well-founded skepticism on 
facial proofs of express consent, taking care that they do not hide 
transactions tainted with duress,
12
 undue influence,
13
 incapacity,
14
 
fraud,
15
 mistake,
16
 misunderstanding,
17
 unconscionability,
18
 or other 
disqualifying counterproofs. Tort law, in contrast, tends to manage 
with a more basic, even atavistic, notion of unconsent; except when 
unconsent comes mixed with offsetting evidence of consent,
19
 fact 
finders have little trouble telling when plaintiffs complain of torts.
20
 
                                                                                                                 
9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) (―[T]he formation of a 
contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent . . . .‖). In rare 
instances, contract law also enforces nonbargains. Even these, however, require proofs of 
consent. See, e.g., id. § 90(1) (providing for enforcement of some promises that evoke 
reasonably foreseeable reliance). 
10 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 & cmt. d (1965) (describing when an actor 
will be subject to liability to another for battery and explaining that the plaintiff‘s consent to the 
contact prevents the liability). 
11 See id. § 158 & cmt. c (defining liability for intrusions on land and explaining that the 
word ―intrusion‖ means that the possessor‘s interest in exclusive possession has been invaded 
by a person or thing without the possessor‘s consent). 
12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (establishing when duress by threat 
makes a contract voidable). 
13 See id. § 177 (establishing when undue influence makes a contract voidable). 
14 See id. § 14 (infants); id. § 15 (mental illness or defect); id. § 16 (intoxication). 
15 See id. §§ 162–164 (establishing when fraud is material and when fraud prevents the 
formation of or voids a contract). 
16 See id. §§ 151–154 (defining mistake, establishing when mistake makes a contract 
voidable, and determining when a party bears the risk of a mistake). 
17 See id. § 20 (determining the effect of misunderstanding). 
18 See id. § 208 (limiting enforceability of unconscionable contracts or terms); id. § 211(3) 
(voiding terms in standard form agreements that one party should know the other party would 
not assent to). See also id. § 77 (disqualifying certain promises from establishing a bargained for 
exchange).  
19 Compare Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 128 (Minn. 1980) (affirming the district 
court‘s finding that those who attempted to forcibly ―deprogram‖ a member of a religious cult 
were not liable for false imprisonment on the grounds that she apparently and temporarily 
consented to their efforts), with Eilers v. Coy, 582 F. Supp. 1093, 1097 (D. Minn. 1984) (finding 
liability for false imprisonment on similar facts on the grounds that the plaintiff never evinced 
genuine consent and any observed evidence of consent was feigned). 
20 Tort law likewise offers comparatively little guidance for determining when consent 
obtains, saying simply that ―[c]onsent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur.‖ 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(1) (1979). 
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The law of contracts and torts tends to regard consent objectively, 
as something established or negated by observable proofs, such as a 
party‘s manifestations.21 As such, it shares the justified skepticism 
that economists evince when they limit themselves to measuring 
revealed preferences.
22
 Courts hesitate to base judgments on what 
parties impliedly did agree to or hypothetically would have agreed to, 
relying on such comparatively weak proofs only when express 
consent fails and salient injustice looms in the alternative.
23
 Even 
then, the common law of contracts and torts tends to stick to such 
general and objective standards as customary practices
24
 or reasonable 
people,
25
 leaving the judgment of individual souls to metaphysical 
moralists. 
In that, contract and tort law perhaps differ from the criminal law, 
which at its boldest, almost pretends to judge a suspect‘s thoughts. As 
Lawrence B. Solum observes, ―[I]n the criminal law, ‗legal consent‘ 
may be a mental state, whereas in torts or contracts ‗legal consent‘ 
may be . . . performative.‖26 Ultimately, however, even the most 
powerful prosecutor can make no pretense of reading minds, but 
instead must rely on the observable, external manifestations of mental 
states. Then, too, criminal law arguably lies outside the bounds of the 
common law proper; it certainly does not lie close to the trinity at 
                                                                                                                 
21 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (―[F]ormation of a contract 
requires . . . a manifestation of mutual assent . . . .‖); id. § 24 (―An offer is the manifestation of 
willingness to enter into a bargain . . . .‖); id. § 38(2) (―A manifestation of intention not to 
accept an offer is a rejection . . . .‖); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(2) (―If words or 
conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they constitute 
apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact.‖); id. § 892 reporter‘s note cmt. b 
(1982) ("No cases have been found bearing upon consent not in any way manifested but proved 
to have existed.").  
22 See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: AN INTERMEDIATE TEXT 25 (2d ed. 1990) 
(―[Y]our preferences are revealed by your actions.‖). But see Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and 
Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 665–71 (2007) 
(explaining why purchasing decisions may fail to wholly measure market demand for public 
goods). 
23 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (limiting enforceability of 
unconscionable contracts or terms). Due to the sometimes sudden and fatal transactions it must 
adjudge, tort law sometimes operates without proofs of express unconsent. See, e.g., Eckert v. 
Long Island R.R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871) (holding railroad liable for death of man struck by 
train when, forced to make sudden decision, he leapt on the tracks to save a child). In such 
cases, tort law looks for proofs of what like parties customarily do not agree to—implied 
unconsent—or what a like party would not have agreed to—hypothetical unconsent. 
24 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(b) (listing express terms, 
course of performance, course of dealing, and usage in trade as respectively weaker proofs of 
meaning of an agreement). 
25 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) (defining negligence with 
regard to the conduct of a reasonable person in like circumstances). 
26 Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 042: Consent, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON, 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/11/legal_theory_le.html (last updated 
Dec. 27, 2009). 
 12/23/2010 10:52:26 AM 
2010] GRADUATED CONSENT IN CONTRACT AND TORT LAW 25 
common law‘s core, springing out of civil customs: property, 
contracts, and torts. Those three intertwined areas of law tout a 
consent-based justification notably different from, and considerably 
stronger than, any justification that criminal law can claim. We 
recognize the principles of property, contract, and tort law by mutual 
consent, day by day, throughout our social existence. In contrast to 
our implied and, often, express consent to those civil rules, criminal 
law, as an exercise of State power, can generally claim no better than 
hypothetical consent. It may lack even that, if the State attempts to 
enforce unjust laws. 
B. The Moral Value of Consent 
Consent plays a prominent role in moral reasoning.
27
 Each of the 
three major types of moral theory—consequentialist, deontological, 
and aretaic—recognize consent as at least a prima facie good. 
Subsections 1, 2, and 3 discuss consent‘s role in each theory, 
respectively. That discussion drops no bombshells; most of us already 
recognize consent as an important factor in moral reasoning. To 
those, the salient virtues of consent, subsection 4 adds a new, 
transcendental argument: because an attempted justification aims, by 
definition, to obtain its audience‘s consent, justifications presume the 
moral significance of consent.
28
 
1. Consequentialist Arguments About Consent 
Consequentialist moral reasoning aims to maximize some good, 
such as pleasure,
29
 happiness,
30
 conformity with rules,
31
 or social 
                                                                                                                 
27 See id. (―[C]onsent works moral magic. . . . [C]onsent has a transformative moral 
power: consent can transform a wrongful action into a rightful action.‖). For contrasting views 
of consent‘s impact on moral and legal reasoning, compare Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of 
Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 122 (1996) (arguing that to consent means to intend the other‘s 
action), with Larry Alexander, The Moral Magic of Consent (II), 2 LEGAL THEORY 165, 166 
(1996) (disagreeing with Hurd about the mental state that represents consent, arguing that to 
consent means, rather, to forego moral objection). As regards the mirror image of consent, 
unconsent, see Anderson, supra note 1, for his conclusion that the view ―that coercion is prima 
facie or pro tanto immoral, is probably the most commonly held view.‖ 
28 You might call this approach ―justice as consent,‖ with a nod to John Rawls‘s theory of 
―justice as fairness.‖ See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3–45 (rev. ed. 1999) 
(explaining his theory of justice as fairness). 
29 See, e.g., George K. Strodach, THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICURUS 72–85 (George K. 
Strodach trans., 1963) (describing and analyzing the Epicurean hedonism). See also, JOHN 
STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 7–8 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publ‘g Co. 1979) (1861) 
(defending Epicureans from the claim that they promote the pursuit of base pleasures). 
30 See, e.g., MILL, supra note 29, at 7 (―[A]ctions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.‖). 
31 See, e.g., J. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in 
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 3, 9–10 (J. J. C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973) 
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wealth.
32
 Consent plays an important role, if not a central one, in each 
of those sorts of consequentialism. John Stewart Mill, for instance, 
praises freedom as the best guarantee of happiness,
33
 while those who 
would maximize social wealth generally prefer mutually consensual 
market exchanges over government-imposed redistribution.
34
 That is 
not to say that consequentialists favor consent over all else, of 
course.
35
 Only someone who treated consent itself—rather than 
pleasure, happiness, or so forth—as the ultimate good would treat it 
with such reverence.
36
 Other, more traditional consequentialists limit 
themselves to celebrating consent as a useful mechanism for 
promoting some other, higher good.
37
 
2. Deontological Arguments About Consent 
Deontological arguments establish moral side constraints on 
action—―rights,‖ in other words—that mark some human interactions 
as at least prima facie wrong.
38
 As Robert Nozick explains, rights 
uphold ―the underlying Kantian principle that individuals are ends 
                                                                                                                 
 
(describing rule utilitarianism and contrasting it, unfavorably, with act utilitarianism). 
32 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15 (3rd ed. 1986) 
(―[W]ealth maximization is an important—conceivably the only effective—social instrument of 
utility maximization.‖).  
33 See MILL, supra note 29, at 58 (―The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one 
another (in which we must never forget to include a wrongful interference with each other‘s 
freedom) are more vital to human well-being than any maxims, however important, which only 
point out the best mode of managing some department of human affairs.‖). See also JOHN 
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 12 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ‘g Co. 1978) (1859) 
(―Mankind are the greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves 
than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.‖). 
34 See infra Part I.C (discussing consent in economic reasoning). 
35 Nor is it to say that every form of consequentialism would value consent as even a 
prima facie good. It seems that every popular sort of consequentialism would, but we can 
imagine a consequentialist theory—say, one that posits biodiversity as the supreme good—that 
regards consent with indifference or even hostility. 
36 So far as I know, no one has advocated that sort of consensualist consequentialism. The 
prospect of trying to maximize social harmony certainly has it charms, however. For one thing, 
it automatically solves the distributional arguments that plague wealth-maximization theories by 
treating each moral agent‘s consent as equally weighty. For another, because we can measure 
enforceable agreements and actionable torts, it offers a better prospect of meaningful calculation 
that theories aiming to maximize happiness or social utility. Although I would hesitate to call 
myself a consequentialist, I do advocate social policies designed to maximize consent. See infra 
Part III.B.3 (discussing ways to make the United States more consent rich). 
37 See Solum, supra note 26 (―[F]or at least some utilitarians, consent would be 
presumptive evidence that the consented-to action would maximize utility and hence be the 
morally best action.‖). 
38 E.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 29 (1974) (―In contrast to 
incorporating rights into the end state to be achieved, one might place them as side constraints 
upon the actions to be done: don‘t violate constraints C. The rights of others determine the 
constraints upon your actions.‖). 
 12/23/2010 10:52:26 AM 
2010] GRADUATED CONSENT IN CONTRACT AND TORT LAW 27 
and not merely means; they may not be sacrificed or used for the 
achieving of other ends without their consent.‖39 That last clause 
bears emphasis. Consent has the power to excuse acts that 
deontological moral theory would otherwise condemn.
40
 Consent 
offers more than mere apologies, however. Its negative, unconsent, 
directs human action into rights-respecting channels.
41
 Mere 
objections do not suffice to establish wrong, of course; the target of 
justified self-defense may cry out in protest.
42
 We discount the 
wrongdoer‘s expression of unconsent, however, out of respect for his 
victim‘s rights. 
Rights and consent thus have a close relationship in deontological 
moral theory. Which comes first? As a matter of day-to-day practical 
reasoning, we assume the existence of certain rights. We take rights to 
persons, property, and promises as given and focus our deliberations 
on determining whether and to what extent those rights suffer 
unconsensual violations. In practice, then, rights precede consent. 
In theory, though—or at least in some theories—rights rely on 
consent. From a deductive point of view, we might determine the 
optimal set of rights by asking what sort of arrangement would best 
respect individual choice. We might look, in other words, for the set 
of rights that maximizes consent, subject to some distribution 
function. We might aim to afford like liberty to all, giving the freest 
possible range to human action, for instance.
43
 Alternatively, we 
might try to calculate which system of rights will maximize overall 
human welfare—a good that everyone presumably values. In any 
case, we would choose our goal with an eye to what we suppose 
people in general—expressly, impliedly, and hypothetically—want. 
Alternatively, from an empirical point of view, we might look to 
custom for evidence of what rights best suit human social life. A 
subtle, unpredictable, and unplanned process of natural selection 
generates forms of society that survive and thrive.
44
 What drives that 
                                                                                                                 
39 Id. at 30–31.  
40 See Solum, supra note 26 (―[C]onsented-to rights violations seem perfectly consistent 
with the idea that rights protect a sphere of individual choice.‖). 
41 As Randy E. Barnett puts it, ―[T]he moral requirement of consent mandates that others 
take the interests of the rights holder into account when seeking to obtain the rights she 
possesses.‖ Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 298 
(1986) (footnote omitted). 
42 See MALCOM MURRAY, THE MORAL WAGER: EVOLUTION AND CONTRACT 153 (2007) 
(―Securing consent . . . is a sufficient condition of treating individuals with respect. It is not a 
necessary condition however: one may be bound by duties irrespective on one‘s occurrent 
consent.‖). 
43 See Solum, supra note 26 (―[M]oral rights and duties . . . create for each individual a 
sphere of autonomous action, in which each individual can direct her own life without 
interfering with the like freedom of others to do the same.‖). 
44 It generates forms that wither away too, of course, but few of those will exist in any 
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process? Mutual consent. Social institutions take shape only under the 
influence of many various individual choices.
45
 The forces of consent 
and its negative, unconsent, thus flow through human life, forming 
patterns of human action, and evolving into forms that promote 
human progress.
46
 In those forms, we can find rights worth 
respecting. 
We might, in sum, conclude that rights and consent advance 
together, evolving through a symbiotic relationship. They rely on 
each other, mutually and crucially. Rights define the sort of consent 
we care about, whereas consent helps us discover the right sorts of 
rights. Consent thus plays a necessary, though not sufficient, role in 
shaping deontological moral theory.
47
 
3. Aretaic Arguments About Consent 
Aretaic moral theories value virtue.
48
 A good person, in that view, 
evinces habits of right action, such as: moderation, industry, civility, 
and generosity.
49
 Only through the exercise of those and other virtues 
can humans live together in peace and prosperity, flourishing in the 
pursuit of happiness. 
Thanks to their regard for virtue, aretaic moral theories also value 
consent. The virtue of justice, for instance, constrains us from 
violating others‘ rights without their consent.50 More generally, 
consent plays a vital role in cultivating habits of right action, so much 
                                                                                                                 
 
sample of cultures winnowed by time and experience. 
45 They evolve under the influence of nonconsensual forces too, of course, such as forces 
of nature. Deliberations over rights can have little impact on those, however. 
46 See generally 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1973) (constructing a 
framework necessary for a critical analysis of prevailing theories of justice and of the conditions 
which a constitution securing personal liberty would have to satisfy). 
47 But see MURRAY, supra note 42, at 153 (―In order to respect autonomous agents‘ 
interests, one must seek their consent in any interaction that involves them. Failure to get their 
consent creates an obligation to refrain from interfering with them. Securing consent, in this 
sense, is a sufficient condition of treating individuals with respect. It is not a necessary condition 
however: one may be bound by duties irrespective of one‘s occurrent consent. It is important to 
see, therefore, that the concept of consent does no justificatory work in this picture. Moral 
action is not determined by consent.‖) (footnote omitted)). That conclusion does not follow 
logically from the premise, however. It remains possible that consent proves necessary to 
establish the sorts of relationships we regard as most justified, for instance, or rights prove 
necessary but insufficient for a complete justification. 
48 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (c. 384 B.C.E.), reprinted in 2 THE 
COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729 (Jonathan Barnes ed., W. D. Ross & J. O. Urmson 
trans., 1984) (highlighting the use of virtue to construct a moral theory). 
49 See, e.g., id. at 1746 (explaining that for an agent to evince virtue ―in the first place he 
must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, 
and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character‖). 
50 See Solum, supra note 26 (―One of the virtues is justice, and humans with this virtue 
will not violate the rights of others without their consent.‖). 
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so that virtue would entirely wither away in a world without consent. 
Just as a weightlifter grows strong only through effort, moral strength 
grows only out of moral struggle. Moral struggle requires moral 
choice and choice presumes consent.
51
 
Because they focus on forms of action and virtues, rather than on 
moral conditions, such as happiness, injustice, or fairness—aretaic 
philosophers do not value consent above all else.
52
 Consent plays 
more than just a helpful ancillary role in virtue theory, however. 
Although he speaks in terms of autonomy rather than of consent, 
Professor Lawrence B. Solum, a leading advocate of virtue theory, 
notes: 
Yankah‘s conclusion that virtue ethics is inconsistent with a 
theory that views autonomy as the highest (and perhaps only 
noninstrumental) value is, in my view, correct. But it does not 
follow that virtue ethics must relegate autonomy to the role of 
an instrumental good—there are other possibilities. For 
example, it could be that some form of autonomy is 
constituitive of human flourishing. Certainly, an Aristotelian 
virtue ethics could (and in my view should) adopt this view of 
the relationship between autonomy and flourishing.
53
 
On that view, aretaic moral philosophies should value consent as a 
necessary constituent of human flourishing. 
4. A Transcendental Argument for Consent 
Students of philosophy tend to associate transcendentalism with 
Immanuel Kant, who argued against metaphysical skepticism on 
grounds that reason necessarily presumes both time and substance.
54
 
Kant had no monopoly on the transcendental form of argument, 
however; Epicurus reportedly used it thousands of years earlier,
55
 and 
it has seen other, less prominent uses since.
56
 Regardless of its 
                                                                                                                 
51 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 48, at 1729, 1752 (distinguishing voluntary from 
nonvoluntary and involuntary actions).  
52 See generally Ekow N. Yankah, Virtue’s Domain, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1167 (2009) 
(outlining virtue ethics as a position in moral philosophy). 
53 Lawrence Solum, Yankah on Virtue Jurisprudence, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Sept. 16, 
2008, 6:45 AM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2008/09/yankah-on-virtu.html. 
54 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 120–28 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., 
Macmillian & Co. 2d ed. 1953) (1781) (describing principles of transcendental deduction). 
55 Adrian Bardon, Transcendental Arguments, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (July 13, 
2006), http://www.iep.utm.edu/trans-ar. 
56 See, e.g., HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 1–21 (1981) (arguing 
against metaphysical skepticism on grounds that it would be impossible for a being existing 
only as, say, a brain in a vat to conceive of brains, vats, or kindred material objects). 
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particular application, a transcendental argument begins with an 
uncontroversial fact, adds a proposition that necessarily follows from 
that fact, and concludes in support of the proposition. In other words, 
a transcendental argument takes the form: 
1. P. 
2. If P, then Q. 
3. Therefore, Q.
57
 
Following that form, the transcendental argument for consent‘s moral 
relevance runs as follows: 
1. A justification aims to win the consent of its intended 
audience. 
2. If a justification aims to win the consent of its intended 
audience, then the argument‘s efficacy varies with the consent of that 
audience. 
3. Therefore, justification presumes the value of consent.
58
 
This argument for consent‘s moral relevance begins with a 
(supposed) truism about the nature of justification. Readers who 
regard step one as an obvious truth can skip to step two. Some might 
doubt step one, however. In particular, a skeptic might counter that 
justifications sometimes aim to mislead their intended audiences, as 
when political leaders conspire to mislead gullible citizens about the 
causes of social unrest, blaming foreign provocateurs rather than 
homegrown disaffection. In such a case, we cannot properly say that 
the justification aims to win the consent of the governed; rather, it 
aims to win their ignorant acquiescence. Though false propaganda 
might in practice win obedience, it does not give rise to any 
obligation to obey.
59
 To frame the matter differently, we might also 
say that political rhetoric wins the consent of those who agree to 
deploy it to their advantage—the politicians who conspire to mislead 
the public. In that event, however, the politicians would constitute the 
―intended audience‖ referenced by the transcendental argument for 
                                                                                                                 
57 Kant‘s argument, for instance, took the following form: ―(1) I make judgments about 
the temporal order of my own mental states. (2) I could not make judgments about the temporal 
order of my own mental states without having experienced enduring substances independent of 
me undergoing alteration. (3) Hence independent, enduring substances exist.‖ Bardon, supra 
note 55; see also KANT, supra note 54, at 74–82. 
58 Alert readers have directed me to a similar argument by Hans-Hermann Hoppe, positing 
that self-ownership ―is implied in the concept of justification as argumentative justification. 
Justifying means justifying without having to rely on coercion.‖ HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, A 
THEORY OF SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND ETHICS 133 (1989). But 
Hoppe argues toward a different end—establishing self-ownership—than the aim of the 
argument here—establishing the relationship between justification and consent. 
59 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162–164 (1981) (defining 
conditions under which fraudulent misrepresentations negate the formation and enforceability of 
a contract). 
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consent. The argument would thus serve to justify the propaganda 
program only with regard to the politicians who knowingly adopt it; it 
would not justify the program‘s supposed persuasiveness with regard 
to the victimized public. 
The claim made in step two of the transcendental argument for 
consent‘s role in justification might, like the claim made in step one, 
strike many readers as obvious.
60
 As long ago as Aristotle, 
philosophers have regarded the end, or teleos, of a thing as the 
measure of its proper function.
61
 On that reasoning, if a justification 
(or, more properly, the person offering the justification) aims to win 
the consent of a particular audience, we can judge whether or not the 
argument succeeds by measuring the consent that the argument 
rouses.
62
 An aesthete might counter that other factors should enter 
into our evaluation of a justification, such as grace or popular 
acclaim. But step two modestly disclaims any say over those matters, 
instead focusing solely on a justification‘s efficacy. And on that 
count, as step one established, we rightly ask whether a justification 
has won the consent of its intended audience. 
The third step of the argument for the moral relevance of consent 
follows as a matter of logic from the first two steps. Even hardcore 
skeptics do not trouble themselves challenging modus ponens, so 
perhaps we could stop here. As a safeguard against sophistry, 
however, let us double-check whether the argument‘s conclusion—
that justification presumes the value of consent—conforms with 
common sense. 
Note, first, that an argument that nobody accepts cannot work as a 
justification. We thus laugh off the arguments, no matter how 
internally consistent or ardently pressed, that a madman makes when 
he claims the right to rule all the Earth. Because his argument wins 
nobody‘s consent, nobody regards it as sufficient justification for his 
coronation. Note, next, that we commonly regard informed consent as 
adequate justification for imposing far-ranging conditions on those 
who accept them; we hesitate to second-guess another‘s pursuit of 
happiness. Lastly, note that we tend to recognize exceptions to that 
                                                                                                                 
60 Although the language of step two carefully leaves open the possibility that consent, 
and thus justification, may obtain in degrees, that is not, strictly speaking, necessary to the form 
of the argument; one could just as well flatly claim that a justification succeeds if and only if it 
wins the consent of its intended audience, and that it fails if the audience does not assent. This 
Article elsewhere claims, however, that consent does, in fact, come in degrees. See infra Part II. 
61 ARISTOTLE, supra note 48, 1729, at 1729 (―Every art and every inquiry, and similarly 
every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly 
been declared to be that at which all things aim.‖). 
62 Alternatively, because it functionally amounts to a mirror image of the same thing, we 
might instead measure the dissent that the argument rouses. 
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rule only in defense of consent itself, as when we refuse to enforce an 
agreement to submit to slavery, when we deny the power of fraud to 
justify a transaction, or when, far from praising a mugger for 
successfully inducing his victim to give up her purse in exchange for 
not giving up her life, we condemn his acts as coercive and 
unjustified. Logic and experience alike thus suggest that we judge an 
attempted justification in terms of whether or not it wins the consent 
of its intended audience. Unsurprisingly, the plain meaning of 
―justify‖ conforms to that meaning.63 
C. The Economic Value of Consent 
The supply/demand charts so often seen in economic texts portray 
expressly consensual transactions. Those charts typically presume 
that sales happen without coercion, that each of the utility-
maximizing parties to an exchange walks away from it relatively 
more happy than before. Only rarely do economists make a similar 
effort to portray unconsensual transactions, such as battery or theft.
64
 
That somewhat monomaniacal focus might well puzzle someone 
trained in the law, a discipline that stretches from contracts between 
fully informed equals to criminal battery. Why does consent matter so 
much in economics? 
From its origin, as the study of household management,
65
 
economics has concerned choice—specifically, how to choose the 
most efficient allocation of scarce resources. But good choices require 
good information.
66
 Consensual transactions, because they reveal 
otherwise hidden preferences, draw forth the information necessary 
for maximizing economic efficiency.
67
 Unconsensual transactions, in 
contrast, offer only a relatively noisy signal about parties‘ 
preferences, one that tends to ignore the victim‘s preferences.68 
                                                                                                                 
63 To ―justify‖ means ―to show to be just, right, or in accord with reason; vindicate.‖ 
WEBSTER‘S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 734 (Victoria E. Neufeldt et al. 
eds., 3d college ed. 1988). 
64 See, e.g., Bruce L. Benson, Property Rights and the Buffalo Economy of the Great 
Plains, in SELF-DETERMINATION: THE OTHER PATH FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 29, 58–61 (Terry 
L. Anderson et al. eds., 2006) (offering an economic model of intertribal relations on the Great 
Plains that accounts both for the gains from trading and for the gains from raiding). 
65 See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. I (c. 350 B.C.E.), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS 
OF ARISTOTLE 1986 (Jonathan Barnes ed., B. Jowett trans., 1984) (studying household 
management to understand the political community). 
66 See Ejan Mackaay, Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and Innovation, 13 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 867, 895 (1990) (―Information is the lifeblood of the economic 
process.‖). 
67 Barnett, supra note 41, at 282 (―[I]n the absence of a consensual demonstration of 
preferences, we do not really know if the exchange is worthwhile—value enhancing—or not.‖). 
68 That is not to say that unconsensual transactions fail to reveal subjective preferences. 
Especially when a would-be victim wards off an attempted wrong, as when a lock guards a safe 
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Consent‘s power to reveal preferences, and thus promote 
efficiency, would not matter if we could read minds. But we cannot. 
Instead, each person and association of persons possesses information 
that others cannot access easily, if at all. Randy E. Barnett categorizes 
such radically dispersed information as either ―personal‖ or ―local.‖69 
The former sort of information inheres to individuals; the latter to a 
particular association of persons. Personal and local information holds 
a wealth of expertise about how to put scarce resources to their best 
uses. It will have scant effect, however, unless brought forth and 
distributed widely in easily digestible form. Their isolation from the 
sources of personal and local information hinders centralized 
authorities from performing that function efficiently. Thanks to a 
myriad of impliedly consensual transactions, however, we have 
developed customary ways of life—such as language, culture, and 
ethics—that allow us to thrive together. And through the medium of 
expressly consensual exchange, we transform personal and local 
knowledge into an easily transmitted, readily understood, and 
universal language: prices.
70
 
While we can thus understand why economists study expressly 
consensual transactions so carefully, we might still question whether 
they should study consent more broadly. What would happen, for 
instance, if we traced the supply and demand curves of hypothetically 
consensual transactions? Preliminary investigation suggests that the 
exercise would generate some interesting results.
71
 Despite the large 
and important role that it already plays in economic reasoning, 
therefore, consent has still more to teach us. 
                                                                                                                 
 
or an armed homeowner stops a burglary, we get a fair measure of what costs each party will 
incur to avoid a transaction. Successful attempts to perpetrate unconsensual transactions, 
however, crush the victim‘s preferences, hiding them under a show of force. We thus can only 
wonder, for instance, how much a murdered man valued life. 
69 Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 
VA. L. REV. 821, 831–35 (1992). Barnett actually employs ―knowledge‖ rather than 
―information.‖ I prefer the latter term because epistemological philosophers use ―knowledge‖ as 
a term of art—and hotly debate its proper meaning. 
70 See LUDWIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM 137–42 (J. Kahane trans., Yale Univ. Press new 
ed. 1951) (1922) (discussing why ―artificial markets‖ are not possible); Friedrich A. Hayek, The 
Use of Knowledge in Society, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 77, 77–78 (1948) 
(―The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate ‗given‘ 
resources . . . . It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of 
the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know.‖). 
71 See Tom W. Bell, Supply and Demand of Government Qua Natural Monopoly, 
AGORAPHILIA (May 29, 2007, 10:28 AM), http://agoraphilia.blogspot.com/2007/05/supply-and-
demand-of-government-qua.html (charting both express and nonexpress demand for 
government services). 
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II. THE SCALE OF CONSENT 
Whether they realize it or not, judges, moralists, and political 
philosophers frequently treat consent as a matter of degree. This Part 
reviews and summarizes their deliberations, mapping consent‘s 
features and using them to chart a path to justification. Section A 
reveals the gradations in and between express consent, implied 
consent, and hypothetical consent, as well as the distinctions that 
mark, in mirror form, the differences between various types of 
unconsent. Refinements in that taxonomy show still further 
distinctions, such as those that contract law recognizes between 
implied consent established by performances, implied consent 
established by prior dealings, and implied consent established by 
usage in trade. Other types of consent likewise reveal various 
subtypes. Section B demonstrates that the resulting scale, which runs 
from the most consensual transaction to the least, measures 
justification.  
A. Gradations of Consent 
This Section describes three types of consent—express, implied, 
and hypothetical—in that order. Both of the first two types qualify as 
actual consent; they differ primarily in how that consent is 
communicated. As subsection 1 explains, a conscious affirmation, 
such as signature, a statement such as ―I agree,‖ or some other 
communicative act,
72
 can convey express consent. In the case of 
implied consent, in contrast, a person may show acceptance of a 
default term by declining to expressly object to it.
73
 Subsection 2 
described the characteristics of implied consent in further detail. 
Hypothetical consent, covered in subsection 3, differs from its express 
and implied counterparts in that it ignores facts about what any given 
party does or does not want, instead relying on a counterfactual 
supposition about what the party would have wanted. Subsection 4 
finds a similar pattern, in mirror form, among the varieties of 
unconsent. Each type of consent and unconsent includes various 
subtypes, as Figure 2, below, illustrates. Subsection 5 discusses 
nonconsent, a category distinct from both consent and unconsent. 
                                                                                                                 
72 Such as shipping conforming goods. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (2004) (prior) 
(providing that shipment of conforming goods in response to an order or offer to buy goods 
constitutes acceptance). 
73 See generally Barnett, supra note 69 (discussing default rules for terms implied in 
contracts). 
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Figure 2: Types and Subtypes of Consent and Unconsent 
1. Express Consent 
Express consent plays a vital role in both the law of contracts and 
the law of torts, though it serves different functions, and operates at 
different levels of sophistication, in each. Contract law devotes a fair 
amount of jurisprudential machinery to determining whether a 
contested agreement has won the express consent of all the parties.
74
 
Tort law, in contrast, asks simply whether there is ―willingness in 
fact‖ for some presumptive rights violation to take place.75 Absent an 
expression to the contrary,
76
 tort law typically assumes that the 
violation of a right—such as battery of a person or conversion of 
goods—evokes the victim‘s unconsent.77 
                                                                                                                 
74 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 3–109, 129, 139, 148–177, 200–
230, 250–251, 273–287, 322–323, and 327–330 (1981) (discussing the situations where parties 
are contractually bound and thus consent to be bound). 
75 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 10A (1965) (―The word 
‗consent‘ . . . denote[s] willingness in fact that an act or invasion of an interest shall take 
place.‖); id. § 892(1) (1979) (―Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur. It may be 
manifested by action or inaction and need not be communicated to the actor.‖). 
76 Or even with one, if it comes tainted with mistake, misrepresentation, or duress. See id. 
§ 892B(2) (―If the person consenting to the conduct of another is induced to consent by a 
substantial mistake concerning the nature of the invasion of his interests or the extent of the 
harm to be expected from it and the mistake is known to the other or is induced by the other‘s 
misrepresentation, the consent is not effective for the unexpected invasion or harm.‖). 
77 Unconsent marks a necessary condition of a tort claim, if for no other reason than that 
some plaintiff must complain. More substantively, because consent operates as a defense, tort 
claims typically arise out of unconsensual transactions. Unconsent cannot represent a sufficient 
condition of a tort claim, however, since many things about which people complain—the 
weather, a competitor, bad luck—do not give rise to legal causes of action. 
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At root, contract law embodies a set of rules defining when 
express consent justifies the invocation of judicial remedies. 
Approximately fifty percent of the sections in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts grapple with consent—how to define it, what 
effect it has, and how to patch up its absence.
78
 Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) devotes one of its most 
powerful, subtle, and controversial sections to implicitly define 
consent.
79
 In general, contract law will enforce only an agreement 
established by the express consent of all parties in privity.
80
 It also 
remedies the breach of some mere promises—notably, those marked 
by strong proofs of express consent.
81
 In addition, contract law 
recognizes a distinction between dickered and form agreements, 
treating negotiated exchanges with more respect than standardized 
ones.
82
 Express consent thus includes two subtypes: consent to 
negotiated exchanges and consent to standardized exchanges. 
Tort law, because it aims primarily to remedy unconsensual acts, 
treats express consent almost as an afterthought. Only about six 
percent of the sections in the Restatement (Second) of Torts grapple 
with defining the scope or effect of consent.
83
 Express consent 
nonetheless supports a powerful defense in tort law, one tending to 
negate a claim for judicial redress.
84
 Thus, for instance, the court in 
McAdams v. Windham
85
 affirmed the denial of an assault-and-battery 
claim on the grounds that the plaintiff‘s decedent had expressly 
                                                                                                                 
78 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has 385 sections. Given the extent to which 
questions of consent pervade contract law, it can prove difficult to separate out those that define 
consent‘s meaning and legal function. I count 193 such sections. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS §§ 3–109, 129, 139, 148–177, 200–230, 250–251, 273–287, 322–323, 327–330 
(1981). 
79 See U.C.C. § 2-207 (2004) (prior).  
80 It may enforce such an agreement to the benefit of parties not in privity, however. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (defining when a party not in privity to a 
contract can enforce it). 
81 See, e.g., id. § 90(1) (explaining the proposition that one who has led another to rely on 
a promise ought to compensate the other for any damage caused by reliance). Plainly, the 
promisor consents to making the sort of promise at issue in section 90(1). The promisee 
expresses consent to the promisor‘s offer not by acceptance, and thus not by agreement, but by 
substantial reliance on the promise. The promisor must reasonably foresee that reliance, 
however, and injustice must threaten to follow, before the law affords a remedy. See id. § 87(2) 
(defining effect of reasonably foreseeable detrimental reliance on offer). 
82 See, e.g., id. § 211 (affording special defenses against standard form agreements).  
83 The Restatement (Second) of Torts has 900 active sections, of which some fifty define 
the scope or effect of consent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 10A, 49–53, 55–62, 69, 
167–175, 252–256, 496A–496G, 523, 583–84, 687, 694, 702, 704, 840C, 892–892D (1965, 
1977, 1979). 
84 See id. § 892A(1) (1979) (―One who effectively consents to conduct of another intended 
to invade his interests cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting 
from it.‖). 
85 94 So. 742 (Ala. 1922).  
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consented to engage the defendant in a boxing match that turned out 
deadly.
86
 The court explained that ―a blow thus inflicted in a friendly, 
mutual combat—a mere sporting contest—is not unlawfully inflicted, 
the parties being engaged in the violation of no law.‖87 Absent the 
decedent‘s express consent, the defendant‘s punches would have 
qualified as intentional torts; excused by consent, they became mere 
unactionable sport.
88
 In the guise of the affirmative defense of 
assumption of risk, express consent can also negate a claim of 
negligence.
89
 
We might say that express consent plays a vital role in tort law, 
albeit in a negative way. Tort law reserves its remedies for those who 
do not agree to suffer some putative wrongdoing—parties who, in 
other words, do not face an affirmative defense of express or implied 
consent. More to the point, though, tort plaintiffs voice the opposite 
of express consent: express unconsent. That, tort law‘s most 
overriding concern, receives closer examination below.
90
 
2. Implied Consent 
The law of contracts imposes many obligations by implication. An 
expression of acceptance presumptively takes effect when put out of 
possession of the offeree,
91
 for instance, and an agreement‘s terms by 
default hew to usage in the relevant trade.
92
 Those implied terms win 
only contingent respect, however; express unconsent can negate the 
imposition of obligations justified only impliedly or by default. A 
contract‘s offeror can thus opt out of the presumed contract rules for 
defining acceptance and instead require, say, a firm handshake.
93
 
Similarly, terms of art keep their technical meaning ―[u]nless a 
different intention is manifested‖ by the parties.94 
Contract law recognizes subtle shadings within implied consent, 
distinguishing between terms implied by performance under the 
                                                                                                                 
86 Id. at 743. 
87 Id. 
88 Tort law also recognizes express consent as a defense to unintentional torts, such as 
those alleging negligent or reckless conduct. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 496B (1965) (―A plaintiff who . . . expressly agrees to accept a risk of harm arising from the 
defendant‘s negligent or reckless conduct cannot recover for such harm . . . .‖). 
89 See id. §§ 496A–496G. 
90 See infra Part II.A.4. 
91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63(a) (1981). 
92 See id. § 202(3)(b) (explaining that technical terms and words of art are given their 
technical meaning when used in their relevant trade). 
93 See id. § 30(1) (providing that the offeror may dictate the terms of acceptance); see also 
id. § 63 (prefacing the default provision that an acceptance takes place when put out of the 
offeree‘s possession with the words ―[u]nless the offer provides otherwise‖). 
94 Id. § 202(3)(b). 
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agreement,
95
 terms implied by past dealings between the parties, and 
terms implied by usage in the trade.
96
 Again, those proofs of consent 
can rouse judicial action only if not trumped by express consent; the 
parties to a contract can explicitly agree to terms different from those 
presumed by prior performance, past dealings, or common custom.
97
 
Like contract law, tort law respects implied consent. For example, 
a community‘s customs establish default presumptions about whether 
silence or inaction constitutes consent—a presumption that only 
express unconsent can trump.
98
 More generally, given that the defense 
of assumption of risk can be used even in the absence of express 
consent,
99
 implied consent has a powerful effect on the scope of tort 
law. The common-law maxim volenti non fit injuria
100
 speaks to 
express and implied consent alike, foreclosing otherwise valid tort 
claims as freely chosen by the supposed victim.  
Tort law treats implied consent with less precision than contract 
law does. The Restatement (Second) of Torts observes, ―Courts 
sometimes speak of implied consent to conduct when the real holding 
is that the conduct was proper under the circumstances.‖101 In other 
instances, tort cases blur the lines between express and implied 
consent, asking simply whether an alleged victim actually consented 
to an invasion of right.
102
 That rough-and-ready approach to implied 
consent should surprise no seasoned student of the common law, 
though; torts have always primarily concerned unconsensual 
transactions, leaving detailed treatment of consensual ones to contract 
law. 
                                                                                                                 
95 See U.C.C. § 2-208 (2004) (prior) (explaining that course of performance shall be used 
to interpret the language of the contract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(b) 
(1981) (explaining the hierarchy of interpretation starting with express terms, then course of 
performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade in descending order); id § 202(4) (explaining 
that when an agreement involves repeated transactions by either party, course of performance is 
given great weight).  
96 See U.C.C. § 1-205 (2004) (prior) (defining course of dealing and usage of trade); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(b). 
97 See supra notes 95–96.  
98 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 cmt. d (1979) (―In determining whether 
conduct would be understood by a reasonable person as indicating consent, the customs of the 
community are to be taken into account. This is true particularly of silence or inaction.‖). 
99 See id. § 496 (1965) (specifying when assumption of risk may be implied). 
100 ―The principle that a person who knowingly and voluntarily risks danger [is deemed to 
have assumed the risk and] cannot recover for any resulting injury.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 
1710 (9th ed. 2009). 
101 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 reporter‘s note cmt. c (1982). 
102 Thus, for instance, the court in Bradford v. Winter, 30 Cal. Rptr. 243 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1963), affirmed a finding that, by expressly consenting to having his lungs examined, the 
plaintiff further impliedly consented to ―the taking of a biopsy, a normal incident of a 
bronchoscopy.‖ Id. at 246. The defendant physician thereby successfully defended against the 
patient‘s battery claim. 
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3. Hypothetical Consent 
Hypothetical consent plays little role in contract law proper; rather, 
it tends to mark a transaction as subject to the rules of quasi-contract, 
an area where courts remedy only salient injustices and offer only 
limited forms of relief.
103
 Thus, for instance, did the plaintiff doctor in 
Cotnam v. Wisdom
104
 win restitution for the medical aid he 
administered to an unconscious man found lying in the street.
105
 
Anyone would have agreed to receive—and pay for—medical care in 
like circumstances. Notably, however, the Cotnam court declined to 
go the further step of allowing the plaintiff to exercise against his 
unconscious (deceased, and not incidentally, wealthy) patient the 
same sort of price discrimination that the doctor routinely exercised 
on his conscious, contracting ones.
106
 Universal hypothetical consent 
proves easier to establish, and weaker in effect, than hypothetical 
consent premised on what a particular individual would have done.
107
 
In tort law, physicians rendering emergency care on unconscious 
victims routinely win a defense against battery on grounds that the 
alleged victim would have consented to treatment if he or she had 
been conscious.
108
 That represents a species of hypothetical consent, 
one that courts have carefully distinguished from express or implied 
consent. Thus, for instance, the court in Kritzer v. Citron
109
 observed 
that ―in an emergency situation where a doctor is privileged to 
proceed with necessary surgery, there is actually no consent 
whatsoever to an invasion of the patient‘s interests. . . . In reality, the 
person whose right is invaded has not by word or act expressed any 
                                                                                                                 
103 See, e.g., Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Corp., 219 A.2d 332, 334 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1966) (―[Quasi contracts] rest solely on a legal fiction and are not contract obligations 
at all in the true sense, for there is no agreement; but they are clothed with the semblance of 
contract for the purpose of the remedy, and the obligation arises not from consent, as in the case 
of true contracts, but from the law or natural equity. Courts employ the fiction of quasi or 
constructive contract with caution.‖). 
104 104 S.W. 164 (Ark. 1907). 
105 Id. at 165–66. 
106 Id. at 167 (―[T]he unconscious patient could not, in fact or in law, be held to have 
contemplated what charges the physician might properly bring against him. . . . [T]here is no 
contract to be ascertained or construed, but a mere fiction of law creating a contract where none 
existed in order that there might be a remedy for a right. This fiction merely requires a 
reasonable compensation for the services rendered.‖). 
107 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 116 cmt. b (1937) (―[R]estitution is not 
permitted to one who has reason to believe that the person, if fully competent, would not, were 
he in a position to do so, be willing to accept the services.‖). 
108 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. 3, illus. 2 (1979) (explaining that 
if a surgeon performing exploratory surgery on a patient under anesthesia discovers a critical 
condition that ―requires immediate action to save [the patient‘s] life or to prevent serious harm 
to him,‖ consent for that action may obtain). 
109 224 P.2d 808 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950). 
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actual or apparent assent.‖110 But, as is generally the case, express 
unconsent can trump hypothetical consent. An emergency patient who 
wakes up in the care of volunteers can thus rightfully command that 
they cease rendering aid, for instance, and someone who clearly 
forbids a life-saving procedure can bring suit for battery against any 
doctor—even a well-meaning one—who provides unconsensual 
care.
111
 
4. Varieties of Unconsent 
All forms of consent detailed above
112
 repeat again in 
unconsensual form. Thus, for instance, a party might expressly refuse 
to accept some proposition or transaction, testifying, ―I do not 
consent!‖ So, too, we might describe an exchange as impliedly 
unconsensual because it does not conform to established practices. 
We thus condemn conversion as a matter of course and afford legal 
remedies even to victims who have never announced, ―I object to all 
conversion of my property, now and hereafter.‖ Lastly, when we 
postulate that a person would not have agreed to something, we mark 
it as hypothetically unconsensual. Just as consent comes in express, 
implied, and hypothetical forms, in other words, so does unconsent. 
Consent‘s subtypes also repeat in the negative range. We 
distinguish transactions that would hypothetically evoke protest 
generally from transactions that would evoke the objections of a 
particular individual. Even though both refer to hypothetically 
unconsensual transactions, ―Most people like peanut butter,‖ 
influences our judgment differently from, ―I would never eat a 
peanut-butter sandwich; it would trigger my allergy.‖ The former 
speaks universally, and can only weakly justify a social transaction. 
The latter speaks more individually and, when considered as a basis 
for judging what food suits the speaker, more convincingly.
113
 
Just as implied consent divides into three subtypes—per acts under 
the agreement, per past agreements, and per custom—implied 
unconsent comprises the subtypes per custom, per past disputes, and 
per acts under the dispute. Here, as generally, unconsent mirrors 
consent. That should not surprise, given that tort law defines 
                                                                                                                 
110 Id. at 811. 
111 See, e.g., Curtis v. Jaskey, 759 N.E.2d 962 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (involving a patient who 
brought an action for battery against her physician for performing an emergency episiotomy 
despite her denial of consent). 
112 See supra Parts II.A.1–3. 
113 The latter speaks more powerfully, too. As discussed infra, at Part II.B, universal 
hypothetical unconsent has more justificatory force—or perhaps more clearly, less anti-
justificatory force—than individuated hypothetical unconsent does. 
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actionable wrongs with an eye to the defense of consent. Observing 
that ―contracts are entered into by the mutual agreement of the 
interested parties, and are required to be performed in accordance 
with their letter and spirit,‖ the Mohr v. Williams114 court concluded 
that, in the tort suit before it, ―[n]o reason occurs to us why the same 
rule should not apply between physician and patient.‖115 
We can thus distinguish between implied contract terms contrary 
to the parties‘ performances, contrary to their past dealings, and 
contrary to usage in trade. Each of those three subtypes of implied 
unconsent corresponds to a different level of enforceability,
116
 
marking each type of unconsent as unique and worthy of 
particularized consideration. Tort courts seldom have occasion to 
delve into such subtleties, granted; happily, we live in a world where 
consensual exchanges far exceed unconsensual ones, providing a 
larger canvas for detailed portraiture. Still, courts sketched the 
outlines, in tort law, of implied unconsent, suggesting that it includes 
some fine distinctions.
117
  
Like express consent, express unconsent contains subtle shadings. 
Tort law reserves its strongest remedy—punitive damages—for 
maliciously personal, intentional wrongs.
118
 Protests to impersonal 
and unintentional wrongs, in contrast, tend to evoke mere remedies 
for negligence.
119
 Though each of those and other forms of express 
                                                                                                                 
114 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905). 
115 Id. at 15. 
116 As discussed infra, at Part II.B, those distinctions order those three types of unconsent 
along a scale of justification. 
117 For instance, the court in Curtis held that ―under usual circumstances, the emergency 
exception may not be used to override the express wishes of a patient who withholds consent to 
a medical procedure.‖ Curtis v. Jaskey, 759 N.E.2d 962, 967 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). The court also 
allowed, however, that ―it is possible to imply consent despite an earlier refusal to assent to a 
particular procedure. The key consideration here is whether the patient intended the refusal to 
apply in the circumstances under which the treatment was rendered. If the circumstances under 
which the procedure was performed were known to the patient, it is likely that the patient 
intended the refusal to apply.‖ Id. at 968. In effect, the court held that the plaintiff‘s express 
unconsent to an episiotomy would trump the consent implied under the doctrine of medical 
emergency, but left room for facts showing that, in context, her refusal did not extend to the 
treatment given. 
118 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979) (―Punitive damages may be 
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant‘s evil motive or his reckless 
indifference to the rights of others.‖). 
119 See id. § 901 (describing the general purposes of tort law damages). Torts such as 
innocent trespass or nuisance may also evoke injunctive relief, of course. See id. ch. 48, intro. 
note (discussing the remedy of injunction). But that also proves true of such intentional torts as 
―assault and battery; false imprisonment; wrongful arrest; . . . [and] malicious prosecution and 
abuse of process,‖ which though ―less frequently the subject of suit for injunction,‖ prove 
especially apt to merit injunctive relief where otherwise the wrong would threaten to recur. Id.; 
see also id. § 936(1) (including among the primary factors to be considered in determining the 
appropriateness of injunctive relief ―the nature of the interest to be protected‖ and ―the relative 
adequacy to the plaintiff of injunction and of other remedies‖). 
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unconsent rouse our righteous indignation, our reactions vary subtly 
from case to case. Most of us would ordinarily object more strongly 
to suffering a gunshot aimed and fired by a vicious criminal than we 
would to suffering the same wound accidently and purely caused by a 
freak meteorite. Despite suffering the same amount of pain after the 
fact, we would complain more vehemently about the former than the 
latter, condemning the criminal but stoically shrugging off the 
vagaries of the uncaring cosmos. Even before the fact, most of us 
would, if forced, choose the latter fate over the former. Holding all 
else equal, who would not prefer to avoid suffering ill-will in addition 
to bloodshed? Express unconsent thus mirrors express consent, 
copying its structure in negative form.
120
 
Unconsent here stands for something distinct from nonconsent.
121
 
For much of what we observe, the labels ―consent‖ and ―unconsent‖ 
simply do not apply. Someone who describes an unwelcome rain 
shower as ―unconsensual‖ (excepting, of course, someone taking 
poetic license) commits a category error. We do best to think of all 
such phenomena as ―nonconsensual,‖ reserving consent talk for 
descriptions of social exchanges.
122
 Only a person can consent, after 
all. And only that power to consent makes it worthwhile to consider 
what it means when a person unconsents. 
5. Nonconsent 
―Nonconsent‖ marks a category distinct from ―unconsent.‖123 The 
latter concerns transactions that generate anti-consensual reactions in 
at least one party, ranging from hypothetical suppositions to violent 
and vocal disagreement. Nonconsent arises when a party neither 
agrees nor disagrees to some condition, whether because consent has 
no role to play at all or because it has been willfully suspended. 
Unconsensual transactions include assaults and trespasses. 
Nonconsensual transactions include such things as rambling at will 
through a public forest or wavering on whether to buy a TV, 
answering the seller‘s pitch with, ―I still haven‘t decided. Will you 
throw in a wall mount?‖ Such transactions do not trigger any legal 
remedy; they neither trespass on any right nor create new obligations. 
Nonconsensual transactions rely on an extant structure of rights, 
                                                                                                                 
120 Like hypothetical and implied unconsent, the subtypes of express consent also range 
along a scale of justification. See infra Part II.B. 
121 For a discussion of nonconsent, see infra Part II.A.5. 
122 I recognize that not everyone hews to that suggested usage. I explain and use it here, 
though, hoping that more will. 
123 I thank Kurt Eggert for convincing me that nonconsent deserves discussion as 
something interestingly distinct from unconsent. 
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granted, which provide the background on which free people paint 
their life projects. To a great extent, and happily, we live in a world 
largely replete with nonconsensual transactions, such as the many 
small and peaceful moments that fill everyday life. Truly, that subject 
merits study. Here, though, I focus on the dyad of consent and 
unconsent, the opposing forces that drive much legal, moral, and 
economic reasoning. 
B. Evaluating the Justificatory Force of Different Types of Consent 
As Part I demonstrates, the language of legal, ethical, and 
economic reasoning evidently recognizes many different types of 
consent. How the literature relates those different sorts of consent to 
one another proves a bit more difficult to discern, however. Here, 
merely quoting the authorities will not suffice. Rather, we must seek 
out a hidden order, a ranking of consent implicit in practice and 
confirmed by theory. This Section takes up that project, and posits a 
scale running from express consent, through implicit consent, and 
down to hypothetical consent. The scale continues into the negative 
range—―below the x-axis,‖ one might say—running from 
hypothetical unconsent, through implied unconsent, down to express 
unconsent. Figure 3, below, illustrates. 
 
Figure 3: The Scale of Consent 
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What does the scale in Figure 3 measure? To put it most simply, it 
measures not simply different types of consent but their amounts. An 
expressly consensual transaction claims the backing of more consent 
than a hypothetically consensual one can claim, for instance, though 
both rest on more consent than a transaction that, because someone 
would have objected or did object to it, falls into the negative range. 
To describe consent in those terms perhaps suggests that we can 
measure it in precise units. In fact, however, consent proves too 
complicated and context-dependent to submit to reliable 
quantification.
124
 In fuzzier but more practical terms, the scale of 
consent affords a rough measure of how justified we regard a 
particular transaction. For instance, we typically treat an expressly 
consensual transaction as justified, not only respecting its terms, as 
when tort law treats consent as a defense to battery, but often even 
helping to enforce them, as when contract law imposes expectation 
damages for breach. Other types of consent and unconsent follow in 
succession, each corresponding to less justificatory power than the 
one before. Subsections 1 and 2 describe the justificatory power of 
the types and subtypes of consent and unconsent, respectively. As that 
study shows, the scale of consent measures degrees of justification. 
1. Types and Subtypes of Consent 
Courts and commentators distinguish between different levels of 
justification even within the bounds of express consent. In contract 
law, for instance, an agreement between fully informed parties having 
equal bargaining power—as when a shopper strikes a bargain at an 
open-air market, for instance, or when a corporation signs a 
negotiated commercial lease—establishes the ideal for express 
consent.
125
 We afford those sorts of transactions the greatest respect. 
In comparison, a party‘s express consent to a standard form 
agreement strikes us as more susceptible to second-guessing.
126
 Thus, 
for instance, might a court decline to enforce such an agreement if 
convinced that a more knowledgeable party would not have agreed to 
                                                                                                                 
124 The economic justification for valuing consent does suggest, however, that we might 
move toward more exact measures of consent by applying information theory to it. See supra 
Part I.C. See generally CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL 
THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (paperback ed. 1963) (arguing that Shannon‘s communication 
theory has important applications to the whole problem of communications in society). 
125 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (defining ―contract‖); id. § 71 
(describing the requirements of a bargained-for exchange); id. § 344 (listing the interests that the 
judicial enforcement of contracts protect). 
126 See id. § 211(3) (limiting enforceability of standardized agreements where one party 
―has reason to believe that the party manifesting . . . assent would not do so if he knew that the 
writing contained a particular term‖).  
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it (showing hypothetical unconsent) and that people customarily do 
not agree to it (showing implied unconsent).
127
 
Even when circumstances leave it out of reach, express consent 
continues to set the standard for judging such surrogates as 
hypothetical and implied consent. The closer those alternatives come 
to mirroring express consent, the better claim they have to our 
respect. When interpreting a contract, for instance, courts begin with 
the language to which the parties have expressly agreed. If vagueness 
persists, courts try to fill the interpretative gap with evidence of how 
the same parties have interpreted the same contract on prior 
occasions. Failing that, courts favor evidence of how the parties have 
acted in prior dealings under other contracts. Should those 
interpretive tools still prove inadequate, courts fall back on usage in 
trade—evidence of how similarly situated parties have customarily 
interpreted the sort of language in question. Because they offer 
progressively weaker proofs of the parties‘ agreement, the subtypes of 
implied consent based on prior performances, prior dealings, and 
usage in trade give progressively weaker justifications for invoking 
relief under contract law.
 128
 
A similar gradation appears in the subtypes of hypothetical 
consent. A court‘s interpretation of an agreement might involve 
consideration of what a particular party would have agreed on, for 
instance. Where one party to a standard form agreement has reason to 
believe what the other party would have agreed to, a court may 
enforce only those terms to which the other party would have 
hypothetically accepted, letting drop out of the contract terms that 
would have evoked the other party‘s disagreement.129 Thus, for 
instance, a court might refuse to enforce an unexpected 
indemnification clause put in tiny print by the party it favors and 
understandably overlooked by the other.
130
 Individuated hypothetical 
                                                                                                                 
127 See infra Part III.A (applying graduated-consent theory to standard form agreements). 
128 See U.C.C. §§ 1-205 (2004) (prior) (defining course of dealing and usage of trade); id. 
§ 2-208 (explaining that course of performance shall be used to interpret the language of the 
contract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(4) (1981) (Where an agreement 
involves repeated occasions for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the 
performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance 
accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given great weight in the interpretation of the 
agreement.); id. § 203 (―In the interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, the 
following standards of preference are generally applicable: . . . (b) express terms are given 
greater weight than course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade, course of 
performance is given greater weight than course of dealing or usage of trade, and course of 
dealing is given greater weight than usage of trade . . .‖); id. § 211(3) (explaining that such a 
―term is not part of the agreement.‖). 
129 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (explaining that such a ―term is 
not part of the agreement‖). 
130 See, e.g., Cal. Tanker Co. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 206 F. Supp. 872, 874 (S.D.N.Y. 
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consent likewise plays a role in validating contracts suspected of 
relying on one party‘s intentional failure to disclose facts that would 
have, had they been known to the other party, discouraged assent.
131
 
In extreme cases, we might lack recourse to any sort of actual 
agreement at all. A court might then invent a hypothetical quasi-
contract to determine the rights of contesting parties.
132
 Courts do so 
hesitantly, however—only when no stronger form of consent can 
resolve the issue
133
 and to compensate only vital aid.
134
 In so doing, 
courts distinguish between what any reasonable person would have 
accepted and what the particular person in question would have 
accepted, favoring the latter, individuated hypothetical consent over 
the former, universal sort.
135
 
Contract law thus places the three main types of consent—express, 
implied, and hypothetical—into an ordered ranking, ranging from 
most consent rich to the least. Those types include various subtypes, 
likewise ranged along a scale of justification, as illustrated in Figure 
3, supra. 
Although it understandably treats consent with rather less detail 
than contract law does, tort law likewise recognizes the different 
justificatory power of different types of consent. Someone who has 
expressly agreed to suffer an offensive touching, as in a boxing 
match, thereby forfeits his battery claim.
136
 Even though by default 
we do not consent to being struck, express consent outweighs implied 
or hypothetical unconsent in such cases. 
                                                                                                                 
 
1962) (granting summary judgment to a shipowner to enforce an indemnity clause in a contract 
with a shipyard despite the fine print in the contract that modified the clause). 
131 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 161(a)–(c), 162, 163 (describing the 
risks that one party takes when that party makes, or fails to make, an assertion that may affect 
the other party‘s willingness to enter into the contract). 
132 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 116 (1937) (allowing restitution for vital 
aid rendered to a party unable to give consent). 
133 See id. § 116(d) (―A person who has supplied things or services to another, although 
acting without the other‘s knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor from the other 
if . . . (d) it was impossible for the other to give consent or, because of extreme youth or mental 
impairment, the other‘s consent would have been immaterial.‖). 
134 See id. § 116(b) (allowing restitution only for ―things or services . . . necessary to 
prevent the other from suffering serious bodily harm or pain‖). 
135 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 49 cmt. a, illus. 2 (1965) (explaining that a 
doctor suffers no liability for performing a tonsillectomy on an unconscious patient without that 
patient‘s permission—a nonemergency procedure that generic, universal hypothetical consent 
cannot excuse—if the patient ―has had trouble with his tonsils and desires that [the doctor] 
remove them,‖ because even though the patient ―has not assented to the tonsillectomy, his actual 
willingness to submit to that operation constitutes consent to it‖). 
136 See Hart v. Geysel, 294 P. 570, 572 (Wash. 1930) (holding that the executor of a 
prizefighter‘s estate could not recover for wrongful death when the prizefighter‘s mortal injury 
resulted from his consent). 
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2. Types and Subtypes of Unconsent 
Tort law, more than contract law, illuminates the dark territory of 
unconsent, showing how its various types and subtypes range along a 
scale of justification. Express unconsent—such as the cry ―Stop 
hitting me!‖—evokes tort remedies more readily than does mere 
implied or hypothetical unconsent. The latter two types of unconsent 
might, after all, face countervailing defenses based in express 
consent.
137
 Similarly, despite the fact that most people would object to 
suffering bodily injury, courts sometimes excuse hypothetically 
unconsensual harms as impliedly assumed risks.
138
 Tort law thus 
ranks express unconsent as less justifiable than implied unconsent, 
and implied unconsent as less justifiable than hypothetical unconsent. 
Though tort law does not portray unconsent with as much detail as 
contract law devotes to consent, leaving the exact contours of 
unconsent‘s subtypes less distinct, each feature of consent necessarily 
casts a unique shadow in unconsent. Just as hypothetical consent 
based on the particular preferences of an unconscious patient can 
excuse an elective operation,
139
 for instance, so too can the 
individuated hypothetical unconsent of an unconscious patient known 
to disfavor a particular doctor bar that doctor from rendering the sort 
of emergency care that universal hypothetical consent would 
ordinarily excuse.
140
 Parallels likewise appear when we compare the 
details of implied consent with those of implied unconsent. Since they 
accord less respect to consent implied by customarily agreed-on terms 
than they do to consent implied to past agreements, for instance, 
courts of necessity regard implied unconsent to customarily 
objectionable terms as less objectionable than the sort of unconsent 
implied by past disagreements between the parties.
141
 In express 
                                                                                                                 
137 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965) (explaining that a plaintiff 
cannot recover for an injury resulting from negligent or reckless conduct when that plaintiff 
expressly agrees to accept the risk of harm, unless the agreement is invalid or contrary to public 
policy). 
138 See id. § 496C (explaining that a plaintiff who understands the risk of harm to himself 
cannot recover for an injury as a result of the defendant‘s conduct if that plaintiff voluntarily 
chooses not to remove himself from the area of risk).  
139 See id. § 49 cmt. a, illus. 2 (―Upon the recommendation of A, his doctor, B assents to an 
operation for the removal of a septum from his nose. Nothing whatever is said about performing 
a tonsillectomy. Actually B has had trouble with his tonsils and desires that A remove them too, 
but he forgets to mention it. A removes the septum and the tonsils while B is under a general 
anesthetic. Although B has not assented to the tonsillectomy, his actual willingness to submit to 
that operation constitutes consent to it and A is not liable to B.‖). 
140 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 116 cmt. b (1937) (―[A] physician who 
has been summoned to attend an unconscious sick person and who, from his knowledge of the 
patient, knows that his own services or the services of any physician would not be acceptable, 
cannot recover for his services.‖). 
141 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892D(b) (1979) (affording an actor a 
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unconsent, too, we see echoes of consent‘s subtypes. Rights 
violations inflicted bureaucratically rouse less indignation—indeed, in 
some cases carry a legal imprimatur—than wrongs inflicted with 
malicious regard to a particular individual. As Joseph Stalin, a master 
of unconsent, allegedly observed, ―A single death is a tragedy, a 
million deaths is a statistic.‖142 
3. Shades of Justification 
Though they naturally tend to address the issue in theoretical 
terms, moral and political philosophy join the law in ranging various 
types of consent along a spectrum of justification. Thus, for instance, 
did Locke offer implied consent (―tacit consent,‖ in his usage) to 
government only as a second-best alternative to express consent, 
which ―[n]o body doubts‖ creates very strong obligations.143 Almost 
everyone—including Locke—discounts the possibility that 
governments can claim to rule by the express consent of their 
subjects.
144
 Those who would justify the State thus face a trade-off 
between the sort of consent that can be had and the sort of consent 
that matters.
145
 That sort of calculation impliedly recognizes that 
express consent matters more than implied consent does. 
                                                                                                                 
 
defense for injuring another in an emergency situation, but only if there is no opportunity to 
obtain consent and ―the actor has no reason to believe that the other, if he had the opportunity to 
consent, would decline‖). Past disagreements can provide sufficient ―reason to believe‖ another 
would unconsent, but so can other proofs. See id. § 892D cmt. a (―[T]he [excused] conduct must 
be so clearly and manifestly to the other‘s advantage that there is no reason to believe that the 
consent would not be given. If the actor knows or has reason to know, because of past refusals 
or other circumstances, that the consent would not be given, he is not privileged to act.‖). 
142 JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT‘S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 686 (Justin Kaplan ed., Little, 
Brown & Co. 17th ed. 2002) (1855). 
143 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 365 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1967) (1690). 
144 That Locke harbors such doubts appears evident from the effort he expends addressing 
the ―difficulty‖ of determining ―how far any one shall be looked on to have consented, and 
thereby submitted to any Government, where he has made no Expressions of it at all.‖ Id. at 
365–66. That would hardly be necessary if express consent were obtained. Cf. DAVID 
SCHMIDTZ, THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE PUBLIC GOODS ARGUMENT 13 
(1991) (―[W]e do not observe this sort of consent on a scale large enough to justify the state.‖). 
Even Hobbes, despite claiming that the State arises ―when a multitude of men do agree‖ to form 
it, recognizes the impossibility of universal express consent when he argues that implied consent 
binds dissenters. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651), reprinted in 3 THE ENGLISH WORKS OF 
THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY, 1, 159, 162–63 (Sir William Molesworth ed., John Bohn 
1839). 
145 See, e.g., DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 185 (1989) 
(―Consent theorists face an imposing structural dilemma . . . . [T]hey need a conception of 
consent that is descriptively plausible . . . . But that description also needs to be normatively 
robust . . . . These two requirements pull in two different directions.‖). 
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Despite their appealing clarity, therefore, attempts to cast 
justification in black-and-white terms run the risk of obscuring 
important distinctions.
146
 Setting up express consent as a necessary 
and sufficient condition for justification would naively gloss over the 
complexity of the real world. In borderline cases, express consent 
proves hard to define. How should we interpret an agreement, such as 
the one that Ulysses made with his crew before they braved the sirens, 
that purports to limit a party‘s freedom of revocation?147 Can a child 
give express consent? How about someone desperately seeking 
protection from a murderous assailant in hot pursuit? In still other 
cases, express consent cannot be had. A dispute over an ambiguous 
contract might require a judgment based on the parties‘ implied 
consent to default terms, for instance,
148
 while protecting an 
unconscious patient‘s rights may call for the invocation of 
hypothetical consent.
149
 
In these and other cases, using express consent as an either/or test 
of justification would leave us unable to choose between a wide 
spectrum of less-than-perfect circumstances. But no adequate theory 
of justification can turn a blind eye to the messiness of the real world. 
Express consent still has a role to play, but not as a threshold test. 
Rather, it should serve as an ideal standard for ranking surrogates 
such as implied and hypothetical consent. The nearer these substitutes 
come to obtaining a person‘s express consent, the better they justify 
the obligations that they allegedly create. 
III. GRADUATED-CONSENT THEORY IN PRACTICE 
This Part puts graduated-consent theory to work, applying it to 
such longstanding problems as the legal enforceability of standard 
form agreements, the justification of political coercion, and the 
meaning of a constitution. Section A explains judicial skepticism 
                                                                                                                 
146 Perhaps that explains why Barnett has argued for viewing the inconsistent application 
of a State‘s laws, as when, in particular, the State asserts a monopoly on the initiation of 
coercion, as no more than one of many factors that should go into determining whether or not a 
State is justified. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Virtues of Redundancy in Legal Thought 
38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 153 (1990). The approach here, in contrast, treats unconsensual 
exchanges, such as those marred by coercion, presumptively unjustified. 
147 As that example alone suggests, we should generally take such agreements seriously. 
For a more detailed examination of the question, from a legal point of view, see generally Kurt 
Eggert, Lashed to the Mast and Crying for Help: How Self-Limitation of Autonomy Can Protect 
Elders from Predatory Lending, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693 (2003). 
148 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(3)(b) (1981). 
149 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892D (1979) (protecting the actor from 
liability where an emergency makes it necessary for him to act before there is opportunity to 
obtain the other‘s consent and the actor has no reason to believe that the other would decline to 
consent if given the opportunity). 
 12/23/2010 10:52:26 AM 
50 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1 
about the enforceability of standard form agreements as a reflection 
of their reliance on a second-rate species of consent. Section B 
analyzes the justification of political coercion as relative both to 
alternative social arrangements and to individual parties. It does not 
suffice, on that view, to simply call a State ―justified‖ or 
―unjustified‖; we should instead describe it as more or less justified 
than an alternative institution with respect to a particular, would-be 
subject. Section B concludes with number of specific suggestions 
about how to render the United States more justified. Consistent with 
that patriotic theme, Section C outlines a consensualist theory of 
constitutional meaning, one that, in contrast to originalist and ―living 
constitution‖ theories, would read a constitution—in partiular, the 
Constitution—so as to maximize the consent of those whom it claims 
to govern. 
A. Standard Form Agreements 
Many scholars question whether courts should enforce a contract 
against someone who failed to have complete information about the 
contract‘s terms and who lacked a range of attractive alternatives to 
agreeing to it.
150
 To the contrary, other authorities, including most 
courts, regard even take-it-or-leave-it, standard form agreements, 
formed between powerful legal entities and relatively powerless 
natural persons, as not only prima facie valid, but moreover as boons 
for social utility.
151
 What does a theory of graduated consent say 
about that debate? 
Both negotiated agreements between equals and standard form 
agreements between unequals can tout the justificatory power of 
express consent. In either case, of course, an invalidating doctrine like 
fraud
152
 or duress
153
 might lead us to second-guess facial proofs of 
                                                                                                                 
150 See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 642 (1943) (―[F]reedom of contract must mean different 
things for different types of contracts.‖); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in 
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.1173, 1176 (1983) (―[Q]uite contrary to ‗ordinary‘ contract 
law, the form terms present in contracts of adhesion ought to be considered presumptively 
(although not absolutely) unenforceable.‖). 
151 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991) (describing the 
benefits to both parties of enforcing a forum-selection clause in a standard form agreement); 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (―Shrinkwrap licenses are 
enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in 
general . . . .‖); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981) (―Standardization 
of agreements serves many of the same functions as standardization of goods and services; both 
are essential to a system of mass production and distribution.‖). 
152 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(1) (defining a fraudulent 
misrepresentation); id. § 164 (defining when fraud makes a contract voidable). 
153 See id. § 175 (defining when duress by threat makes a contract voidable). 
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consent, regard the transaction as unjustified, and decline to enforce 
the supposed agreement. But those problems afflict all contracts, 
whether dickered between equals or offered only on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis to isolated and weak individuals. On that front, at least, 
standard form agreements get as much legal respect as any other 
expressly consensual agreement.
154
 
In other respects, however, the law regards standard form 
agreements with suspicion. They alone can suffer partial or complete 
invalidation if a party fails to reveal a particular contract term to 
which the other party, had he or she been put on notice, would have 
disagreed.
155
 More particularly, the U.C.C. calls for enforcing only 
"―conspicuous"‖ exclusions or modifications of implied warranties,156 
a mechanism evidently designed to protect individual consumers from 
the boilerplate of large, cunning retailers. The U.C.C. also offers 
consumers special protections in their dealings with merchants, such 
as by preventing the common law‘s ―last-shot rule‖157 from imposing 
contract terms on consumers,
158
 ensuring that consumers continue to 
enjoy the common law‘s standards for option contracts,159 and 
protecting consumers from unwittingly agreeing to merchant 
                                                                                                                 
154 Whether or not they evoke the same moral weight remains less clear. To speak frankly, 
but not disparagingly, practical philosophers have not had as much, as long, and as carefully 
documented experience dealing with questions surrounding the justification of contracts as 
courts and legal commentators have. Even folk wisdom remains a bit shaky on this front, given 
that standard form agreements have become part of everyday life only relatively recently, and in 
only a few cultures. For what it is worth, however, it bears noting that folktales typically treat 
deals with the devil as presumptively binding. Only by satisfying the devil‘s terms—often by 
way of equally devilish cleverness—can the hero win freedom. See, e.g., STEPHEN VINCENT 
BENÉT, THE DEVIL AND DANIEL WEBSTER (1936), reprinted in FAVORITE TRIAL STORIES 204 
(A. K. Adams ed. 1966). 
155 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (―Where the other party has 
reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the 
writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.‖). 
156 U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2004) (prior). See also § 2-316(3) (giving effect to expressions like 
"as is" in consumer contracts only if "set forth conspicuously" in the writing).  
157 The last-shot rule risks treating acceptance of goods as acceptance of all terms attached 
to them, even if those terms differ from those discussed in the party‘s negotiations and even if 
the accepting party does not notice the difference. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 59 (specifying that a reply to an offer that contains different or additional terms 
from those of the offer ―is not an acceptance but is a counter-offer‖); id. § 50(1) (defining 
acceptance as a manifestation of assent ―in a manner invited or required by the offer‖); id. 
§ 69(1)(a) (providing that receipt of benefits presumably offered conditional on compensation 
can operate as acceptance). 
158 See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2004) (prior) (providing that an acceptance or confirmation with 
additional terms must, unless between merchants, receive express consent to become effective); 
see also Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1166 (6th Cir. 1972) (interpreting 
the language of section 2-207(1) so as to foreclose mere acceptance of goods from proving 
acceptance of proposed additional terms). 
159 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(1)(a) (requiring at least a 
recitation of purported consideration to support an option contract), with U.C.C. § 2-205 (2004) 
(prior) (providing that option contracts are not revocable for lack of consideration). 
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contracts that would otherwise curtail modification or rescission 
rights.
160
 More generally, many courts regard standard form 
agreements as, by default, procedurally unconscionable.
161
 Upon 
proof of some accompanying substantive unconscionability,
162
 such 
as a price far above market
163
 or an abandonment of vital legal 
rights,
164
 such courts will decline to specifically enforce the 
contract.
165
 A court might even go so far as to declare such a 
supposed agreement void.
166
 
The law thus regards the sort of consent that justifies enforcing 
standard form agreements as distinctly weaker than the sort of 
consent that justifies enforcing agreements negotiated between 
equals. Dickered agreements, because they more accurately reflect 
their parties‘ interests, generally do better than standard form 
agreements in achieving all those same ends that make consent so 
                                                                                                                 
160 See U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (2004) (prior). Because the provision requires a separate 
signature ―except as between merchants,‖ it would presumably also give a merchant receiving a 
form agreement from a consumer like protections. That logical possibility does not matter much 
in practice, though; section 2-209(2) plainly aims to protect consumers from merchants offering 
form agreements.  
161 See, e.g., Alexander v. Anthony Int‘l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2003) (observing 
that the element of procedural unconscionability ―is generally satisfied if the agreement 
constitutes a contract of adhesion‖); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 171 (Cal. 1981) 
(explaining that standard form agreements ―bear within them the clear danger of oppression and 
overreaching‖). In some courts, qualifying as an adhesion contract does not alone render a 
contract procedurally unconscionable. See, e.g., Zuver v. Airtouch Commc‘ns, 103 P.3d 753, 
760 (Wash. 2004) (―[T]he fact that an agreement is an adhesion contract does not necessarily 
render it procedurally unconscionable.‖). That caution appears, however, to be tied to the view 
that procedural unconscionability alone—as opposed to procedural and substantive 
unconscionability together—may render a contract or contract term unenforceable. See id. at 
760 n.4 (―We have not explicitly addressed whether a party challenging a contract must show 
both substantive and procedural unconscionability. Our decisions in Nelson and Schroeder, 
however, analyze procedural and substantive unconscionability separately without suggesting 
that courts must find both to render a contract void. . . . In its amicus brief, the Association of 
Washington Business urges us to join the majority of courts that require proof of both 
substantive and procedural unconscionability. This court, however, need not consider issues 
raised only by amicus, and we decline to do so in this case.‖). 
162 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 113 (Cal. 
2000) ((―If the contract is adhesive, the court must then determine whether ‗other factors are 
present which, under established legal rules—legislative or judicial—operate to render it 
[unenforceable].‘‖) (alteration in original) (quoting Graham, 623 P.2d at 173l. 3d at 820) 
(footnote omitted)). 
163 See, e.g., Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1966) 
(refusing to enforce standardized form agreement requiring payment of $1,364.10 for a freezer 
worth $348), rev’d on other grounds, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y. App. Term 1967). 
164 See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 118 (―[T]he doctrine of unconscionability limits 
the extent to which a stronger party may, through a contract of adhesion, impose the arbitration 
forum on the weaker party without accepting that forum for itself.‖). 
165 See, e.g., McKinnon v. Benedict, 157 N.W.2d 665, 671 (Wis. 1968) (―We find that the 
inadequacy of consideration is so gross as to be unconscionable and a bar to the plaintiffs‘ 
invocation of the extraordinary equitable powers of the court.‖). 
166 See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th, at 124 (―If the central purpose of the contract is 
tainted with illegality, then the contract as a whole cannot be enforced.‖). 
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appealing: promoting the pursuit of happiness, safeguarding 
individual rights, cultivating virtue, and maximizing social wealth. In 
other words, standard form agreements embody less consent than 
agreements negotiated between equals do. 
What makes the standard form agreement a weaker proof of 
consent? The problem is not evidentiary in the usual sense; indeed, a 
standard form agreement typically touts such administrative virtues as 
embodiment in a writing,
167
 integration,
168
 and signatures.
169
 The 
problem instead arises from the very nature of standardization, which 
necessarily obfuscates the detailed preferences of at least one of the 
parties—the so-called ―adhering‖ one—to the standard form 
agreement.
170
 That represents a very real cost of standardized form 
agreements. That is not to say that they impose more net costs than 
benefits. Plainly, many businesses find it worthwhile to offer standard 
form agreements and many consumers find it at least bearable to 
accept them. It is only to say that the efficiency gains afforded by 
standard form agreements come at the expense of carefully capturing 
individualized preferences. 
Already somewhat weakened by a watered-down variety of 
express consent, a standard form agreement can completely collapse 
if confronted with proofs of its unconsent. Again, some such proofs—
such as proof that one party signed under duress—would prove 
powerful enough to void any facially valid contract.
171
 Showing a 
weakness unusual in contract law, however, standard form 
agreements can fall prey to proofs of implied or hypothetical 
unconsent.
172
 Thus, for instance, might a court strike from a standard 
form agreement a term to which one of the parties would not have 
                                                                                                                 
167 See U.C.C. § 2-201 (2004) (prior) (establishing a statute of frauds for the sale of goods).  
168 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(1) (1981) (making a party‘s assent 
to a standardized agreement an adoption of the agreement as integrated). 
169 See id. § 131 (describing standards for the enforceability of signed writings). 
170 It might also obfuscate the detailed preferences of the party proposing the standard form 
agreement, of course, as when a business opts to sell at a flat rate rather than engaging in price 
discrimination. That sort of ignorance, because the business opts for it, does not engage our 
moral senses quite so much as does our worry that standard form agreements effectively stifle 
consumers‘ voices. From an information-theoretic point of view, though, we might well wonder 
whether the costs of either type of ignorance—be it of the consumer or of the business—
outweigh the efficiency gains of standard form contracting. 
171 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (specifying when duress makes a 
contract voidable). 
172 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 
1965) (―[W]hen a party . . . signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no 
knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of 
his consent, was ever given to all the terms.‖); id. at 450 (explaining that a court should examine 
procedurally suspect terms to determine whether they ―are ‗so extreme as to appear 
unconscionable according to the mores and business practices of the time and place‘‖) (quoting 
1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 128 (1963)). 
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agreed, had that party known about the term when manifesting assent, 
if the other party had reason to foresee hypothetical unconsent.
173
 
Thus, too, a court might void an agreement to which no reasonable 
person would have agreed (thus marking the agreement as 
hypothetically unconsensual)
174
 and that deviates from customary 
norms (thus marking the agreement as impliedly unconsensual).
175
 
Typically, the victimized party must also expressly unconsent after 
the fact, as in a legal pleading; courts do not go hunting for standard 
form agreements to invalidate them against the parties‘ wishes.176 
To put it in algebraic terms, we might say that whereas prior 
individualized express consent outweighs all post hoc unconsent, a 
combination of express, implied, and hypothetical unconsent can 
together trump earlier standardized express consent. So the general 
structure of the law of standardized form agreements suggests, at any 
rate.
177
 In this application, the question of enforceability turns on the 
balance of the forces of consent and unconsent. To say that prior 
individualized express consent outweighs post hoc unconsent means 
that legal institutions will enforce the agreement.
178
 To say that strong 
proofs of unconsent trump an earlier standardized agreement means 
that the law refuses to remedy an alleged breach. Judging from those 
examples, it evidently takes some fair margin of unconsent to rouse a 
court into action. Rightly so; legal enforcement generates many 
private and public costs, and should remain sheathed until faced with 
salient wrongs. 
B. The Problem of Justifying Political Coercion 
How, if at all, can those who exercise political coercion justify 
conspiring against others‘ rights? This, the problem of justifying the 
State,
179
 has drawn the attention of many political philosophers and 
                                                                                                                 
173 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3). 
174 See, e.g., Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1966) 
(concluding that the defendants ―were handicapped by a lack of knowledge, both as to the 
commercial situation and the nature and terms of the contract which was submitted in a 
language foreign to them,‖ and that they would not have agreed to the contract had they been 
better informed of its terms), rev’d on other grounds, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y. App. Term 
1967). 
175 See, e.g., id. (stressing the difference between the contract and market prices). 
176 It is conceivable that an administrative agency might do so, however. 
177 That formula does not necessarily describe the moral or economic value of standardized 
form agreements; I here discuss only the law. 
178 In apparent deference to the express unconsent of the breaching party, however, courts 
typically afford only money damages, rather than specific performance, in such cases. 
179 ―State,‖ here and throughout this article, means an administrative body that credibly 
claims an exclusive right on the initiation of coercion within a particular geographic area. That 
definition basically follows Max Weber‘s classic one. See MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 154 (Talcott Parsons ed., A. M. Henderson & Talcott 
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received many various answers.
180
 This Section offers a fresh 
approach to the problem of justifying political coercion. Subsection 1 
describes the consensus view that the State cannot be justified by 
appeal to express consent, and that it has only a very tenuous claim to 
the implied consent of its subjects. Subsection 2 contends that we 
should evaluate any given consent-based justification of the State in a 
doubly relative manner: as more or less effective than alternative 
justifications, judging along a scale of consent; and as effective not 
for every person, but rather only with respect to each particular 
individual, if at all. Subsection 3 explores what that approach to 
justifying the State suggests about how we can win a better, more 
consent-rich world. 
1. The Difficulties of Justifying the State by Actual Consent 
Commentators claim that the State cannot be justified as an 
institution created by the actual consent—express or implied—of the 
persons over which the State claims jurisdiction. David Hume, for 
instance, said that the assertion ―that every particular government, 
which is lawful, and which imposes any duty of allegiance on the 
subject, was, at first, founded on consent and a voluntary 
compact[,] . . . is not justified by history or experience, in any age or 
country of the world.‖181 He allowed that early, customary, stateless 
societies might have enjoyed self-governance thanks to mutual 
compact, the terms of which ―were either expressed, or were so clear 
and obvious, that it might well be esteemed superfluous to express 
                                                                                                                 
 
Parsons trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1947) (1922) (―A compulsory political association with a 
continuous organization . . . will be called a ‗state‘ if and in so far as its administrative staff 
successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the 
enforcement of its order.‖). 
180 See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 11–86 (2004) 
(arguing that a constitution must derive its legitimacy from ―necessity‖ and ―propriety,‖ rather 
than consent, which is impossible in practical terms); HOBBES, supra note 144 (setting out a 
foundation for states based on social contract theories); LOCKE, supra note 143, at 365–66 
(―[E]very Man, that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, or any part of the Dominions of any 
Government, doth thereby give his tacit Consent, and is as far forth obliged to Obedience to the 
Laws of that Government, during such Enjoyment, as any one under it . . . .‖); NOZICK, supra 
note 38 (arguing in favor of a minimal state that is only involved in protection against force, 
theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and the like; PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Richard W. Sterling 
& William C. Scott trans., W. W. Norton & Co. 1985) (c. 380–360 B.C.E.) (discussing the order 
and character of the just City-State); RAWLS, supra note 28 (justifying the state under a model 
of social contract theory in which individuals in the original position with its veil of ignorance 
would choose the ―liberty principle‖ and the ―difference principle‖); SCHMIDTZ, supra note 144 
(legitimizing the State as necessary to provide the provision and production of public goods). 
181 DAVID HUME, ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY 471 (Eugene F. Miller ed., 
Liberty Classics rev. ed. 1987) (1777).  
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them.‖182 Hume denied that same justification to modern States, 
however, on grounds that new systems of governance require new 
consent.
183 
Randy E. Barnett likewise denies that a contemporary State can 
rightly lay claim to the express or implied consent of those over 
whom it claims jurisdiction.
184 Just as Hume granted the possibility of 
justifying ancient governments on consent, so Barnett grants that 
―unanimous consent to obey the law is quite possible, but only if the 
cost of exit is sufficiently small, either because jurisdiction is not 
territorially based or because the territory is not too large.‖185 An 
institution that does not claim exclusive jurisdiction over a particular 
geographic area does not qualify as anything like a State as we know 
it.
186 Barnett also holds that even a very small State would be ―too 
large‖ to claim the justificatory power of consent founded on 
consent.
187 On that view, a State cannot rightly claim that its subjects 
actually consent to its rule.
188
 
The State‘s failure to obtain the actual consent of those it governs, 
to many commentators, is irrefutable proof that it cannot be 
justified.
189
 Lysander Spooner, for instance, famously complained: ―If 
any considerable number of the people believe the Constitution to be 
good, why do they not sign it themselves, and make laws for, and 
administer them upon, each other; leaving all other persons (who do 
not interfere with them) in peace?‖190 Robert Wolff, likewise 
                                                                                                                 
182 Id. at 468. Hume immediately adds: ―If this, then, be meant by the original contract, it 
cannot be denied that all government is, at first, founded on a contract, and that the most ancient 
rude combinations of mankind were formed chiefly by that principle.‖ Id. (emphasis in the 
original). 
183 See id. at 470–71 (―[T]he agreement, by which savage men first associated and 
conjoined their force . . . is acknowledged to be real; but being so ancient, and being obliterated 
by a thousand changes of government and princes, it cannot now be supposed to retain any 
authority.‖). 
184 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 180, at 11 (―I challenge the idea, sometimes referred to 
as ‗popular sovereignty,‘ that the Constitution of the United States was or is legitimate because 
it was established by ‗We the People‘ or the ‗consent of the governed.‘‖). 
185 Id. at 43. 
186 See supra note 179 (discussing the definition of the State). 
187 ―Most modern cities are probably too large, but even if they are small enough, states are 
certainly too large to command meaningful unanimous consent.‖ BARNETT, supra note 180, at 
43.  
188 See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, Not the Constitution in Exile, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 669, 671 (2006) (―[I] reject basing the legitimacy of the Constitution on the 
consent of the governed in any literal sense. Instead, legitimacy is based on the merits of the 
institutions established by the Constitution and whether the commands of those institutions are 
entitled to a prima facie duty of obedience.‖). I take Barnett to thereby say that his theory of 
legitimacy relies on hypothetical rather than on implied or (especially) express consent. 
189 See generally Ilya Somin, Revitalizing Consent, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 753, 775 
n.78 (2000) (collecting authorities). 
190 LYSANDER SPOONER, NO TREASON NO. VI: THE CONSTITUTION OF NO AUTHORITY 
(1870), reprinted in THE LYSANDER SPOONER READER 71, 87 (George H. Smith ed., 1992). 
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confronting the problem of justifying political coercion, concluded, 
―the solution requires the imposition of impossibly restrictive 
conditions which make it applicable only to a rather bizarre variety of 
actual situations.‖191 Here, at least, philosophers have proven 
remarkably in touch with the people; a recent poll purports to show 
that only twenty-one percent of its voters think that the United States 
can claim the consent of the governed.
192
 
Barnett offers a somewhat more qualified assessment of the State‘s 
justification. He both allows the possibility of expressly or impliedly 
consensual systems of self-governance,
193
 and credits consent-
justified laws as having the power to ―restrict almost any freedom 
except an inalienable right or the freedom to respect the rights of 
others.‖194 Such views suggest a correlation between degrees of 
consent and degrees of justification.
195
 But Barnett dwells on a 
different sort of spectrum—a spectrum of legitimacy196—that 
measures whether and to what extent a given State‘s subjects should 
presume that they have moral obligation to obey its laws.
197
 ―When 
consent is lacking,‖ explains Barnett, ―a law must be both necessary 
to the protection of the rights of others and proper insofar as it does 
not violate the rights of those upon whom it is imposed if it is to bind 
in conscience.‖198 A lawmaking process that satisfies those two 
requirements enjoys more legitimacy than one that satisfies them less 
well, or not at all. Barnett concludes by describing legitimacy as ―a 
matter of degree rather than an all-or-nothing-at-all characteristic.‖199 
Barnett thus paints varying shades of legitimacy on institutions 
                                                                                                                 
191 ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 22–23 (Arthur C. Danto ed. 1970). 
192 Only 21% Say U.S. Government Has Consent of the Governed, RASMUSSEN REP. (Feb. 
18, 2010), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/february_ 
2010/only_21_say_u_s_government_has_consent_of_the_governed. The survey also purports to 
show that sixty-three percent of the political class thinks the government has the consent of the 
governed, whereas only six percent of voters with mainstream views do, and that seventy-one 
percent of all voters view the federal government as a special interest group. Id.  
193 See BARNETT, supra note 180, at 40–43 (arguing that if the relevant lawmaking unit 
were very small, then unanimous consent would be possible and practical). 
194 Id. at 51. 
195 Barnett observes, for instance, that if a legal system to which ―everyone does consent in 
a real way‖ is feasible, ―the governmental legal system with which we are familiar might be 
both unnecessary and improper—or at least less legitimate than this polycentric alternative.‖ Id. 
at 77 (emphasis added).  
196 In Barnett‘s usage, a ―legitimate‖ law carries normative weight that a merely ―valid‖ 
law—a law ―enacted according to the accepted legal process‖—may or may not. Id. at 48.  
197 See id. at 48 (―In the absence of actual consent, a legitimate lawmaking process is one 
that provides adequate assurances that the laws it validates are just.‖ (emphasis added)); see also 
id. at 52 (framing his argument as one designed to show ―that some constitutions are more 
legitimate than others‖). 
198 Id. at 51. 
199 Id. 
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justified, if at all, by hypothetical consent.
200
 The spectrum described 
here does not necessarily thereby contradict Barnett‘s theory, 
however.
201
 Rather, it confirms his methodology while applying it to a 
broader framework for assessing justificatory claims, one that spans 
from express consent to express unconsent and that applies not just to 
States but also to nonpolitical organizations and common-law 
transactions. The next subsection explains. 
2. Relativity and Political Justification 
We can evaluate the supposed justification of a State or other 
social institution by two standards: first, relative to the degree of 
consent that the institution can claim; second, relative to persons 
subjected to the institution‘s jurisdiction. This subsection explains 
those two standards and how they interact. This, a theory of relativity 
for political justification, measures any given State or social 
institution relative both to a scale of consent and to a range of 
subjects.
202
 Justification, like the graduated consent with which it 
correlates, comes in degrees and varies across individuals.  
a) Relativity in Degree of Justification 
Different attempts to justify social institutions succeed or fail to 
different degrees. Justification, in other words, is not simply a binary, 
―yes or no‖ property. Many people would doubtless regard that as a 
truism, part and parcel of the nature of argumentation. Should the 
proposition need support, however, it can rely on the same sort of 
transcendental argument set forth above for the moral primacy of 
consent.
203
 Tailored to fit the question at hand—how to justify a 
social institution‘s exercise of jurisdiction—the argument runs thusly: 
1. A justification aims to win the consent of its intended 
audience. 
2. If a justification aims to win the consent of its intended 
audience, then a justification of a social institution succeeds or fails 
depending on whether it obtains the consent of its intended audience. 
                                                                                                                 
200 See supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text (discussing Barnett‘s denial that States 
can claim express consent). Separately, Barnett also denies that they can boast implied or 
consent. See BARNETT, supra note 180, at 14–19 (arguing that neither voting nor residency 
implies consent). At least according to the taxonomy set forth in this Article, that leaves States 
only hypothetical consent, at most. 
201 But see Barnett, supra note 188, at 671–72 (―[I] reject a notion of legitimacy based on 
the degree of actual acceptance by the population. Instead, legitimacy is based on whether the 
institutions established by the Constitution ought to be accepted; and, if so, the commands of 
those institutions are binding even upon those who do not consent to them.‖). 
202 More precisely, you might call it a theory of relativity squared. 
203 See supra Part I.B.4. 
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3. Consent comes in degrees. 
4. Therefore, a justification of a social institution succeeds or 
fails relative to the degree of consent that it obtains from its intended 
audience. 
As with regard to the transcendental argument for consent‘s moral 
weight generally, this particular argument for adopting a relative 
approach to justifying social institutions starts with an 
unobjectionable premise about the nature of justification. Step two 
ties the argument to the particular problem of justifying a social 
institution. Step three offers an observation about consent, one 
detailed and defended above.
204
 From those steps the conclusion 
logically follows: a justification of a social institution succeeds or 
fails relative to the degree of consent that it obtains from its intended 
audience. 
For example, most people would say that a social institution that 
governs its members only by their express consent does so with more 
justification than an alternative institution capable of claiming only 
hypothetical consent. Thus does the Catholic Church more justifiably 
govern the marriages of its baptized members than does, say, the 
Baptist Church. That holds true even if the Baptist Church were to 
claim that, because it offers the one true path to salvation, Catholics 
would convert if they realized their ignorance. The Baptist Church 
could in that event muster a claim only of hypothetical consent, at 
best, and one contingent on a contestable theological presumption, at 
that. The express consent supporting the Catholic Church‘s 
relationship with its members gives it a justification for exercising 
jurisdiction over their souls—a justification stronger than any that the 
Baptist Church can claim. (The Baptists can take consolation in the 
thought that their church has won many souls if its own, though.) 
As discussed below, the State‘s jurisdictional claims submit to a 
similar analysis.
205
 In all such cases, we assess a social institution in 
terms more refined than ―justified‖ or ―not justified‖; we rank it as 
―more justified‖ or ―less justified‖ than a range of alternative 
institutions. Justification, like the consent it relies on, comes in 
degrees. 
b) Relativity to Subjects 
Because a justification succeeds only through persuasion, it stands 
or falls only relative to a particular audience. A justification cannot 
                                                                                                                 
204 See supra Part II.A. 
205 See infra Part III.B.3.b (discussing amending the Pledge of Allegiance, and changing 
how it is administered, as a way of making the United States more consent rich).  
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float about as a disembodied universal given, for nothing in the 
noumenal realm has the power to accept or reject it. Nor can a 
justification rest on its laurels, assuming that past success guarantees 
future results. Even a justification that boasts an unblemished record 
of prior endorsements must win the consent of any new party to 
whom it would apply. 
Who makes up a justification‘s audience? As with any audience, 
people do. Loose metaphors about ―company spirit‖ and ―national 
will‖ notwithstanding, each individual remains a moral agent capable 
of independent sensation, reason, and choice. Almost no one remains 
a mere atomistic individual, of course; we instead join in complex 
social molecules, cells, organs, and bodies. Still, just as atoms serve 
as fundamental units for chemists, individual persons provide the 
fundamental units of consent theory. We must begin at its source if 
we want to understand consent‘s role in social institutions.206 
In the first instance, only an individual can expressly consent to a 
proposition. That still holds true if a person acts in a representative 
capacity, choosing as an agent for some absent principal, because 
even a deliberative body such as a congress or parliament relies on 
individual choices and binary votes. If we want to know whether a 
particular institution justifiably exercises jurisdiction over someone, 
therefore, we must ask whether that person consented to it. A 
justification stands or falls only relative to each individual person 
who accepts or rejects it. 
Although the individual stars in this account of justification, social 
institutions play an important supporting role. If an individual 
consents to have her interests represented through a social 
mechanism, she by default consents to the acts that her duly 
authorized agents take within the proper bounds of their 
employment.
207
 What Nozick said of justice thus also holds true of 
justification: ―Whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is 
itself just.‖208 Analogously, whatever we regard as justified with 
respect to a particular social institution, we should also regard as 
justified with respect to any individual who has consented to that 
institution‘s representation. In other words, justification holds true in 
transition. 
                                                                                                                 
206 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 65, at 1986 (―As in other departments of science, so in 
politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the 
whole.‖). 
207 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958) (defining agency 
relationship); id. § 12 (―An agent . . . holds a power to alter the legal relations between the 
principal and third persons . . . .‖). 
208 NOZICK, supra note 38, at 151. 
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One need not become a methodological individualist to accept this 
account of justification. Methodological individualism casts doubt on 
the very existence of social organizations. Murray N. Rothbard, for 
example, maintained, ―‗Societies‘ or ‗groups‘ have no independent 
existence aside from the actions of their individual members.‖209 But 
one can believe that social organizations exist independently of their 
members
210
 and still agree that a justification succeeds only relative to 
the individuals who consent to it, whether they do so directly or via 
the representation of a social institution to which they have 
consented.
211
 At the extreme, one could even adopt this relational 
view of justification while believing that social institutions act, sense, 
and think with all the ontological status of individual human 
persons.
212
 
What beliefs does this theory of justification preclude? It precludes 
believing that a justification succeeds relative to a person who refuses 
to consent to its terms, either directly or through a justified 
representational scheme. It also precludes believing that a justification 
succeeds relative to a person who could have but did not consent, or 
relative to a person who did not consent and would not have 
consented.
213
 For example, one who accepts that both individual 
human persons and social institutions have the power to expressly 
consent to a justification would find it well neigh impossible to 
simultaneously believe that a social institution can rightly bind an 
individual who objects to its representation. The power of consent to 
justify social relations does not increase as it flows from individuals 
                                                                                                                 
209 MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE: A TREATISE ON ECONOMIC 
PRINCIPLES 2–3 (Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2nd ed., scholar‘s ed. 2004). 
210 For a thoughtful exposition of that view, see HERZOG, supra note 145, at 202. After a 
brief critique of methodological individualism, he boldly concludes, ―[n]othing then stands in 
the way of casting the consent of the governed as a relation between two corporate actors, the 
people and the government.‖ Id. at 202. 
211 It is not so clear that Herzog would follow so far. Against the view that individual 
consent to social institutions matters, he counters, ―The demand that each individual‘s views 
determine political outcomes is impossible to satisfy, or (to put the same point differently) 
romantic, or (again) a puerile bit of anarchism.‖ Id. But Herzog makes a categorical error. To 
condition the justification of a social institution‘s power over an individual on that individual‘s 
consent is not to say that each individual member of an institution must have the power to 
control it. If we want act in cooperation with others, as Herzog says, ―[I]n the end we must 
renounce some options and proceed.‖ Id. Contra Herzog, however, we can renounce those 
options consensually, and thereby justify an institution‘s actions. 
212 Those who hold such beliefs will find that they can read every use of ―individual‖ or 
―person‖ in these pages to also refer to ―individual social organization‖ or ―legal person‖ with 
no loss of effect. But fascists, who regard social organizations as more real and important than 
individual humans, will probably find that this translation strategy gives unsatisfying results.  
213 These two conditions flow out of preferring express consent to implicit or hypothetical 
consent. For the example of the doctor who stumbles across an unconscious man, see supra Part 
II.A.3. For a discussion of the validity of justifications based on these substitutes for express 
consent, see supra Part II.B.1. 
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to larger entities; if anything, consent‘s justificatory power weakens 
with each attenuating level of agency and sub-agency. A successful 
justification must therefore aim to win express consent in each case 
where it might be had. 
It consequently follows that no one can justify a social order‘s 
claim to power over a person by mere invocation of a supposed 
―collective will.‖ Such a justification fails on grounds of circularity, 
for it presumes that the characterization of a group‘s will binds its 
constituents prior to their having agreed to such representation. How 
could a scheme of collective representation rightly bind an individual 
who dissents to having its voice drown out her own? Even if a social 
organization has sufficient ontological standing to entertain cognitive 
states independent of its members—a highly suspect supposition—its 
express consent to a given justification cannot bind any individual 
who denies that the organization‘s consent reflects his or her own.  
Although this account emphasizes that a justification stands or 
falls only relative to those who accept or reject it, it is not thereby 
equivalent to moral relativism. Like most major ethical theories, 
relativism comes in more than one flavor.
214
 Editorialists get upset 
over a particular sort of moral relativism, the sort that holds both that 
―right‖ means ―right for a given culture,‖ and that it is therefore 
wrong to condemn another culture‘s morals. Though editorialists 
attack that type of moral relativism for eroding honored values, 
philosophers attack it for employing ―right‖ and ―wrong‖ in a 
contradictory fashion. Bernard Williams has thus described moral 
relativism as ―possibly the most absurd view to have been advanced 
even in moral philosophy.‖215 The theory of relative justification set 
forth here should give neither editorialists nor philosophers similar 
grounds for outrage, however, because it does not hold that standards 
of justification vary from society to society. Quite the contrary, 
measuring each putative justification relative both to alternative 
justifications and to the justification‘s intended audience generates a 
standard, one that works both within and across cultures, based on the 
universal features of consent. 
The account of justification given here does resemble another sort 
of moral relativism, however: the sort Gilbert Harman defends as no 
more than ―a soberly logical thesis . . . about logical form.‖216 Harman 
                                                                                                                 
214 For a discussion of the distinctions between different sorts of relativism, see Michael J. 
Perry, Moral Knowledge, Moral Reasoning, Moral Relativism: A “Naturalist” Perspective, 20 
GA. L. REV. 995 (1986). 
215 Bernard Williams, An Inconsistent Form of Relativism, in RELATIVISM: COGNITIVE 
AND MORAL 171, 171 (Jack W. Meiland & Michael Krausz eds., 1982). 
216 Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativism Defended, in RELATIVISM: COGNITIVE AND MORAL 
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claims that morality arises among people who come to an agreement 
or understanding about their relations with one another.
217
 He 
concludes that although cross-cultural moral judgments are not 
―wrong,‖ they make sense only in relation to such agreements or 
understandings.
218
 The approach to justification offered here likewise 
presents a ―soberly logical thesis‖: a justification applies only with 
regard to its intended subject. It thus makes no sense, strictly 
speaking, to flatly claim, ―X is justified.‖ The sentence should, 
properly speaking, go on to add, ―X is justified with respect to Y.‖ In 
other words, we should treat ―justify‖ as a transitive verb. 
Nonetheless, this theory of justification differs from Harman‘s 
moral relativism in an important sense. Harman has drawn criticism 
for stripping cross-cultural judgments of all moral weight.
219
 He 
would have us judge Hitler, for example, only relative to the moral 
agreements or understandings that Hitler shares with others. But 
Harman‘s critics maintain that someone like Hitler ―ought not to kill 
us—he would be wrong to kill us—and there are reasons justifying 
these judgments, unappealing as they may be to one of his 
background.‖220 In contrast to Harman‘s moral relativism, the theory 
of relativity for justification gives those who suffer coercion a ready 
defense against their oppressors. The difference lies in the scope of 
the theories. Harman‘s restricts moral judgments to intra-group 
relations. But justification applies between groups, between 
individuals, and between groups and individuals. Anywhere that two 
bodies capable of consent meet, it stands ready to evaluate whether or 
not their relations satisfy the criterion for justification: has each party 
consented to the relationship, either directly or through a justified 
representational mechanism?  
3. Making the United States More Consent Rich  
Recognizing that consent comes by degrees encourages us to seek 
marginally more of it. Particularly, in politics, new possibilities for 
reform appear once we begin to see States as justified only relative to 
                                                                                                                 
 
supra note 215, at 189, 189. For a discussion of how justifications may be relative in the sense 
of being more or less powerful with respect to one another, see supra Part III.B.2.a. 
217 Harman, supra note 216, at 189. 
218 Id. 
219 See, e.g., Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1094 (1982) 
(explaining that Harman‘s ―counterintuitive conclusion[] . . . that there are no objectively valid 
reasons ultimately justifying any moral position‖ ought to be questioned); Heidi Margaret Hurd, 
Note, Relativistic Jurisprudence: Skepticism Founded on Confusion, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1417, 
1494–1504 (1988) (providing a critique entitled ―Harman‘s Relativism of Inner Judgments‖). 
220 Moore, supra note 219, at 1094–95. 
 12/23/2010 10:52:26 AM 
64 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1 
better or worse forms of government, and only relative to the 
individual persons subject to a State‘s exercise of jurisdiction.221 In 
contrast, to speak of a State simply as ―justified‖ (or not) discourages 
us from even asking the right questions. This subsection demonstrates 
how the theory of graduated consent works in practice, applying it to 
an exemplar State—the United States—in an effort to make it more 
justified with respect to those it governs—its citizens and residents. 
Far from a merely theoretical concern, that project aims to remedy the 
surprisingly widespread view, revealed in a recent poll, that the U.S. 
government cannot claim the consent of those it claims to govern.
222
 
Clearly, the United States could stand to grow more consent rich. 
a) Easing Exit 
Because implied consent does more to justify a State than 
hypothetical consent alone can,
223
 a State that affords its citizens full 
freedom of exit enjoys a stronger claim to rightfully exercise 
jurisdiction over its them than does a State that denies a like 
freedom.
224
 In the real world, of course, freedom of exit comes only 
by degrees. Still, it varies enough from case to case to allow for 
fruitful comparisons. 
During much of the mid-twentieth century, for instance, the United 
States allowed its citizens greater freedom of exit than did the Soviet 
Union.
225
 That marked difference between the countries gave the 
former a comparatively stronger justification for exercising 
jurisdiction over its citizens than the latter could claim over its 
own.
226
 Hence the moral force of Ronald Reagan‘s demand, ―Mr. 
Gorbachev, tear down this wall!‖227 Hence, too, the celebration, by 
that wall‘s destroyers, of their newly won freedom from oppression. 
                                                                                                                 
221 See supra Part III.B.2 (describing the double relativity of political justification). 
222 Only 21% Say U.S. Government Has Consent of the Governed, supra note 192 . 
223 I add ―alone‖ because a State that can plausibly claim both implied and hypothetical 
consent might well enjoy a better justificatory status than one claiming only implied consent. 
224 We might add ―and residents‖ to canvas the class of persons over which States typically 
claim jurisdiction. Interestingly, however, residents do not (unless imprisoned) typically suffer 
much loss of the freedom of exit their host States‘ jurisdiction. Rather, States typically try to 
expel unwelcome residents. 
225 Even granting cases such as U.S. citizens fleeing the draft by moving abroad, the 
United States never had anything close to the Iron Curtain. 
226 The United States could also claim, as a signal that it enjoyed a comparatively stronger 
claim to the implied consent, that appreciable numbers of those who managed to slip through 
the Iron Curtain fled to the United States, pledged their allegiance to it, and became citizens. 
227 President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in 
West Berlin 3 (June 12, 1987), available at http://www.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks_ 
on_East_West_RElations_at_Brandenburg%20Gate_061287.pdf. 
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To say that the United States offered a more consent-rich form of 
government than the Soviet Union did is not to say, finally and flatly, 
―The United States was justified.‖ A State cannot fail to fall short of 
winning the universal express consent of all over whom it claims a 
monopoly on the initiation of coercion,
228
 but instead can claim 
justification only by degrees, relative to some alternative mode of 
social organization.
229
 Even if it bested the Soviet Union in terms of 
winning the consent of its subjects, the mid-twentieth-century United 
States still fell far short of consent‘s highest standard. The United 
States did not, does not, and cannot claim universal and express 
consent. No State reasonably could. The United States in the 1950s 
did justly claim a comparatively greater degree of consent from its 
subjects than the Soviet Union could, granted, and even today the 
United States remains a fairly consent-rich jurisdiction. The United 
States would have enjoyed a stronger claim to the hypothetical 
consent of its subjects if it had done a still better job of protecting 
their natural and civil liberties back in the 1950s, however. We could 
say the same of the United States today.
230
 
More to the point, the United States could have done more to 
respect its citizens‘ freedom to exit, even though it decidedly beat the 
Soviet Union on that count. The United States could do more today, 
too. It could, for instance, heed Ilya Somin‘s call for recognition of 
generalized exit rights, under which individuals and groups would 
enjoy the freedom to opt out of all but a few government functions 
relating to national defense and legal rulemaking.
231
 Those exercising 
their exit rights would escape any taxation or regulation associated 
with the programs they escape but also, of course, forego the 
associated benefits.
232
 Because they would make it easier to escape 
federal programs such as Social Security or health and safety 
regulations, generalized exit rights would render those programs more 
consensual. It would also, per the causal link described above, render 
the U.S. government more justifiable, relative both to those who 
accept its services and to those who decline them, than at present. 
                                                                                                                 
228 See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the difficulties of justifying the State by actual 
consent). 
229 See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the double relativity of political justification). 
230 Cf. BARNETT, supra note 180, at 48–52 (―The problem of legitimacy . . . is to establish 
why anyone should care what a constitutionally valid law may command. My answer is that we 
should care and, consequently, may owe a prima facie duty to obey a law, only if the processes 
used to enact laws provide good reasons to think that a law restricting freedom is necessary to 
protect the rights of others without improperly infringing the rights of those whose liberty is 
being restricted.‖). 
231 Somin, supra note 189, at 782–84. 
232 Id. at 783. 
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b) Amending the Pledge of Allegiance 
As typically administered—impressed on children well under the 
age of consent and not taken very seriously by adults—the U.S. 
Pledge of Allegiance
233
 does not carry much justificatory weight. Nor 
could the government redeem the Pledge by demanding that each of 
its adult citizens officially say or even sign it, because even the most 
patriotic of us would bridle at the prospect.
234
 Any such indoctrination 
ceremony would, however facially free, carry an inevitable taint of 
coercion.
235
 The power differential between the U.S. federal 
government and an individual person renders any supposed 
expression of consensual allegiance suspect, as does the take-it-or-
leave-it nature of the proposed deal. A court would, if it considered 
the transaction through the lens of contract law, doubtless judge the 
Pledge of Allegiance procedurally unconscionable.
236
 
Nor do the substantive terms of the Pledge of Allegiance 
encourage confidence in the fairness of the bargain. The citizen 
reciting the Pledge offers allegiance ―to the flag of the United States 
of America, and to the republic for which it stands,‖ followed by a 
description of the latter—―one Nation,‖ and so forth. The Pledge does 
not specify what, if anything, the United States must do to deserve a 
citizen‘s allegiance. Granted, perhaps we could read ―with liberty and 
justice for all‖ as a condition on the pledger‘s allegiance. But that 
would also suggest, much more controversially, that the Pledge‘s 
force would lapse if the United States failed to qualify as ―one nation, 
under God, [or] indivisible . . . .‖ At the least, the Pledge could 
certainly make any such supposed quid pro quo much clearer. 
The United States might have a marginally stronger claim to justly 
exercise jurisdiction over its subjects if the Pledge of Allegiance were 
given under less suspect circumstances and in less one-sided terms. 
Rather than training children to habitually recite the Pledge, for 
instance, we might reserve it for the sober contemplation of fully 
capable adults, and ask them to recite the Pledge—or not, as each 
alone sees fit—free from any hint of state coercion, bribery, or even 
                                                                                                                 
233 See 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) (setting forth the text of the Pledge of Allegiance and the 
proper manner of its delivery). 
234 But see Sanford Levinson, Constituting Communities Through Words That Bind: 
Reflections on Loyalty Oaths, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1440 (1986) (questioning the reasons behind 
widespread resistance to political loyalty oaths). 
235 See HERZOG, supra note 145, at 192 (reviewing the ―ugly‖ use of loyalty oaths in Tudor 
England and concluding, ―[t]hose hankering after the use of such oaths today are simply starry-
eyed, unwilling to think seriously about the degrading and punitive experiences of those forced 
to swear.‖) 
236 See supra Part III.A (discussing standard form agreements). 
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notice.237 Changing the administration of the Pledge, from collective 
indoctrination to personal deliberation, would help ease its procedural 
unconscionability. To fix the Pledge‘s substantive unconsionability, 
we have to edit its terms. 
The following Pledge, version 2008, offers improved clarity and 
fairness: ―I pledge allegiance to the laws of the United States of 
America, on condition that it respect my rights, natural, constitutional, 
and statutory, with liberty and justice for all.‖238 Pledge v.2008 
improves on the 1954 version in several ways. For one thing, it has its 
speaker pledge allegiance not to the flag, nor even to the political 
institution for which that flag stands, but rather to ―the laws of the 
United States of America.‖ The United States was founded, after all, 
on an argument that when a State violates the rights of its citizens, it 
does not deserve their allegiance.
239
 For the same reason, this 
upgraded Pledge clarifies that its speaker‘s commitment comes 
conditioned on the United States respecting his or her rights. Pledge 
v.2008 thus puts the United States and its citizens more equal footing 
than Pledge v.1954 does. 
Admittedly, however well reasoned as a theoretical manner, any 
suggestion to edit the 1954 Pledge of Allegiance risks rousing 
heartfelt objections.
240
 A flag may not be an argument, but it still 
inspires powerful devotion; so, too, does the Pledge of Allegiance. 
Proposing that we drop ―under God‖ from the Pledge adds wounded 
piety to patriotic fervor, summoning a dark storm of emotions. 
Nobody should feel compelled to abandon the customary Pledge of 
Allegiance, however. For most Americans, for quite some time, the 
1954 version will remain well known and frequently recited. 
Prudence would probably council that result even if human nature did 
not compel it. But some might come to prefer a newer pledge, one 
that hearkens back to the fundamental principles of the U.S. way of 
self-government. Happily, anyone who prefers the 2008 Pledge can 
                                                                                                                 
237 Having citizens sign pledges would, because it would allow the State to keep close tabs 
on dissenters, tend to cast doubt on the probity of the whole enterprise. 
238 Uncopyright 2008, Tom W. Bell. For the Pledge's first publication and some 
background about its inspiration, see Tom W. Bell, Upgrading the Pledge of Allegiance, 
AGORAPHILIA (June 4, 2008, 5:05 PM), http://agoraphilia.blogspot.com/2008/06/upgrading-
pledge-of-allegiance.html. 
239 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (―Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the 
Governed . . . whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the 
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it . . . . ―). 
240 See, for example, the tenor of comments to a blog post in which I initially proposed 
Pledge of Allegiance v.2008. Comments to Pledging to Mislead Students, COLLEGE LIFE OC 
(June 4, 2008, 6:15 PM), http://collegelife.freedomblogging.com/2008/06/04/pledging-to-
mislead-students. 
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adopt it with little fanfare, leaving others to stick with the 1954 
Pledge if they see fit. All of us can recite our pledges together, too, 
because the cadences of the 2008 Pledge march in step with those of 
its predecessor. 
 
Allegiance v.1954 Allegiance v.2008 
I pledge allegiance I pledge allegiance 
To the flag To the laws 
Of the United States of America Of the United States of America, 
And to the Republic On condition that 
For which it stands It respect my rights, 
One nation, Natural, 
Under God, Constitutional, 
Indivisible, And statutory, 
With liberty and justice for all. With liberty and justice for all. 
 
Americans have a long tradition of challenging—and sometimes 
rejecting—every political institution that has dared to claim to rule 
them. We have celebrated our liberty to pursue happiness, and our 
freedom from oppression, in many various and changing ways.
241 The 
Pledge of Allegiance went through various versions prior to the 1954 
version, for instance, and calls for a newer, better Pledge have 
sounded frequently since them.
242 The 2008 Pledge offers fidelity to 
traditional American principles, easy accessibility, and, most 
relevantly for present purposes, a way to help make the United States 
more consent rich.
243
 What more could a true patriot want? 
c) Citizen Courts 
It stands as a fundamental principle of justice that we cannot 
entrust one party to unilaterally judge its disputes with other parties. 
Locke cited the threat of self-judgment as a fundamental justification 
for the State, which offers a neutral third party to adjudicate disputes 
                                                                                                                 
241 See generally DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, LIBERTY AND FREEDOM: A VISUAL HISTORY 
OF AMERICA'S FOUNDING IDEAS (2005) (analyzing how the words ―liberty‖ and ―freedom‖ have 
been defined through images since colonial times). 
242 See John W. Baer, The Pledge of Allegiance: A Short History, OLD TIME ISLANDS 
(1992), http://www.oldtimeislands.org/pledge/pledge.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2009) (reviewing 
previous versions of the Pledge and offering two possible changes for the future). 
243 To ensure that no statutory privilege interferes with the free use of the Pledge I have 
described, I have deliberately cast it into the public domain—hence the ―Uncopyright 2008‖ 
notation used in footnote 238. For a description of the legal and policy aspects of that 
publication strategy, see Tom W. Bell, Intellectual Privilege: A Libertarian View of Copyright 
167–81 (Feb. 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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between contesting private parties.
244
 James Madison, in The 
Federalist No. 10, argued that the proposed Constitution would help 
remedy the ills of faction, echoed that sentiment.
245
 If it cannot 
plausibly claim to administer justice impartially, a court cannot win 
the trust of those subjected to its jurisdiction. A biased court cannot, 
properly speaking, adjudicate; it can only command one party to serve 
another‘s will. As the label suggests, a partial court lacks the virtues 
of a real, entire, impartial one. 
This poses a problem for the resolution of disputes between a State 
and those subjected to its legal jurisdiction. How impartially can 
agents of the State, acting as the judges of its courts, decide such 
disputes? ―Not well enough,‖ citizens and residents might 
understandably worry.
246
 
It thus looks at least unwise, and arguably unjust, to give federal 
authorities exclusive jurisdiction over disputes that call for applying 
the U.S. Constitution. Granted, federally appointed judges typically 
grapple with issues that raise no immediate risk of self-judgment, 
such as a diversity tort claim between private parties rather than, say, 
litigation over the constitutionality of affording judges life tenure. 
Still, though, such judges remain employees of the federal 
government, duty bound to serve its interests. More significantly, 
from the point of view of parties ordered to appear in federal court, 
the confirmation process for federal judges discriminates against 
those most likely to defend private rights against political power. No 
judge who reads the Constitution with an eye to sharply limiting the 
federal government will likely survive the confirmation process. 
Federal politicians prefer to appoint judges who will, at the margin, 
benefit federal politicians. And what could benefit a politician more 
than power? 
If we view the U.S. Constitution as a contract—a standard form 
agreement offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by an awesomely 
powerful government to a comparatively powerless individual
247—we 
                                                                                                                 
244 LOCKE, supra note 143, at 344 (describing ―the end of Civil Society, being to avoid, and 
remedy those inconveniencies of the State of Nature, which necessarily follow from every 
Man‘s being Judge in his own Case‖) (emphasis in the original). 
245 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 55–56 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (1788) (―No 
man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause: because his interest would certainly bias his 
judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.‖). 
246 For a similar expression of skepticism applied to the related question of the proper 
scope of juries' powers, see LYSANDER SPOONER, TRIAL BY JURY (1852), reprinted in THE 
LYSANDER SPOONER READER, supra note 190, at 121, 121 (―But for their right to judge of the 
law, and the justice of the law, juries would be no protection to an accused person, even as to 
matters of fact; for, if the government can dictate to a jury any law whatever, in a criminal case, 
it can certainly dictate to them the laws of evidence.‖) (emphasis in the original). 
247 See infra Part III.C (arguing in favor of this view). 
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cannot help but note the glaring inequity of letting only federal 
authorities decide questions of federal power. No just court would 
enforce a standard form agreement between grossly unequal parties, 
imposed by one on the other under conditions that raise serious 
doubts about the offeree‘s consent, and that lets the all-powerful 
offeror alone decide disputes arising under the agreement.
248
 A clause 
reading, ―I have the sole power to interpret this agreement,‖ reeks too 
much of substantive unconscionability to win a court‘s approval.249 
Indeed, the patent unfairness of such a clause cannot help but raise 
procedural doubts about whether the parties bargained for an 
exchange at all,
250
 undermining the enforceability of the entire 
agreement.
251
 
Happily, we can easily read the U.S. Constitution to avoid the vice 
of self-judgment. Its plain text by no means mandates that only 
federally employed judges can decide the scope of federal power. 
Rather, it provides that the Constitution itself—not federal judges—
―shall be the supreme Law of the Land.‖252 Even Article III, which 
establishes constitutional courts, goes only so far as to say, ―The 
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution‖;253 it does not claim exclusive jurisdiction 
over all such cases. We thus remain at complete liberty to remedy the 
problem of self-judgment by establishing what we might call citizen 
courts: adjudicative bodies designed to resolve disputes between the 
federal government and other parties under the same arbitration 
procedures that private parties customarily use in resolving civil 
litigation.
254
 
                                                                                                                 
248 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981) (voiding contracts where 
threats leave no reasonable alternative but to manifest assent); id. § 177 (establishing that undue 
influence can render contract unenforceable); id. § 208 (authorizing limitations on or voiding of 
unconscionable contracts). 
249 See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 177 (Cal. 1981) (―[A] contract which 
purports to designate one of the parties as the arbitrator of all disputes arising thereunder is to 
this extent illusory—the reason being that the party so designated will have an interest in the 
outcome which, in the view of the law, will render fair and reasoned decision, based on the 
evidence presented, a virtual impossibility.‖). 
250 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) (―To constitute consideration, a 
performance or return promise must be bargained for.‖); id. § 77 (specifying how a promise 
which ―by its terms the promisor . . . reserves a choice of alternative performances‖ can fail as 
consideration). 
251 See id. § 17(1) (―[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a 
manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.‖). 
252 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
253 Id. art. III, § 2. 
254 See, e.g., Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AM. ARB. ASS‘N, 
§ R-13 (June 1, 2009), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440#R13 (describing the process by 
which directly appointed arbitrators choose a third arbitrator). 
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How would citizen courts work? They would arise at the option of 
any party to a legal dispute with the federal government being heard 
by a federal court. Each party—including the federal one—would 
choose one judge. Those two judges would then agree on a third. 
Together, the panel of three judges would decide the parties‘ dispute. 
Rather than leaving questions about the power of the federal 
government solely in the hands of federal agents, therefore, a citizen 
court would rely on judges to which the disputants have consented. 
Because they would help to remedy the potential for partiality by 
federal courts, citizen courts would offer more justifiable judgments. 
Giving citizens direct access to the ―judicial power‖ created by the 
Constitution would, granted, represent a rather different approach to 
adjudicating federal disputes than the one currently in force. The 
prospect of citizen courts raises a great many questions. For instance: 
does the U.S. Constitution make room for them? It proves 
encouraging that the Constitution grants federal officials broad 
leeway in appointing inferior officials
255
 and that federal judges 
already show remarkable flexibility in following rules of procedure 
agreed to by litigating parties.
256
 But further exploration of the 
constitutionality, mechanics, and wisdom of citizen courts can wait; 
we will doubtless have plenty of time before the U.S. federal 
government surrenders the power to act as its own judge. When and if 
it does, though, we will have occasion to celebrate a more justified 
government. 
C. Toward a Consensualist Theory of Constitutional Law 
How should we read and apply a constitution? The answer 
depends, in large part, on why we want to attribute any particular 
meaning at all to its words. A philosophically minded jurisprude 
might, for instance, pursue an ideal, and probably idyllic, Truth, 
approaching constitutional hermeneutics the way that people of faith 
approach religious texts. Even apart from the risk of idolatry it would 
pose, however, that approach would ill serve the main reason why 
most of us care about a constitution‘s meaning: to resolve disputes. 
                                                                                                                 
255 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (―[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States . . . .‖). 
256 See, e.g., Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake 
the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 579 (2007) 
(examining ―the limits on parties‘ ability to design and implement through contractual 
agreements their own set of public dispute resolution rules‖ and concluding that ―there is a 
presumption that litigation rules may be modified by an ex ante contract and that such a contract 
is subject to specific performance‖). 
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A constitution serves as a social-coordination device, one that we 
read with an eye to promoting peace, prosperity, and personal 
freedom.
257
 Here I argue that we can best achieve those ends by 
adopting a consensualist theory of constitutional decision making, one 
that interprets and constructs the Constitution so as to maximize the 
consent of those it claims to govern and, thus, maximizing its 
justifiability. With all due respect to Justice John Marshall, in other 
words, we should aspire to forget the trappings of power and pomp 
that surround a constitution,
258
 instead subjecting it to the same 
interpretive rules that we routinely apply to humble contracts.
259
 
Because we invoke a constitution in order to resolve disputes, 
constitutional decision making often serves as little more than a sort 
of weapon, taken up or set aside for purely tactical reasons. Although 
courts and commentators should ultimately aspire to a more universal 
standard when they choose between interpretive theories, none of us 
should disregard the virtues of partisan constitutional debate. Legal 
warfare spills far less blood than the lethal warfare it supplants, 
provides the entertaining spectacle of jurisprudential contests, and 
encourages the discovery and refinement of new and better 
interpretative tools. 
Still, despite those benefits of treating constitutional decision 
making as merely a weapon of partisan advantage, it has a distinct 
cost: it tends to erode the social capital embodied in the rule of law. 
We expect private civil litigants to treat constitutional law as little 
more than one of many tactical devices. So long as they do not in 
practice violate an adjudicated understanding of the law, after all, we 
leave private parties free to pursue their private ends, and so long as 
they stop short of wasting a court‘s time with a bad-faith argument,260 
we excuse private parties to argue for any meaning of the law they 
like. We expect public parties to meet a different and higher standard, 
however. Those empowered to enforce a constitution, in other words, 
                                                                                                                 
257 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. (explaining the Constitution as a mechanism to ―insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure 
the Blessings of Liberty‖). 
258 Arguing for construing congressional powers broadly, Marshall famously said ―we 
must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.‖ McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
259 But see MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23 (1988) (―Treating the Constitution like a contract . . . is difficult to 
defend cogently.‖); see also Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of The Constitution: 
Can Originalist Interpretation be Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482, 1495–519 (1985) (rejecting 
a consent-based justification of originalism). 
260 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. § 11(b)(2) (requiring that legal arguments to a federal court be 
―warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or 
reversing existing law or for establishing new law‖). 
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should set aside their private interests and read it so as to best 
promote the public good. 
The public good alone offers a dangerously vague standard for 
guiding constitutional decision making, however. Apart from the 
obvious costs of uncertainty—confusion, conflict, and error—
applying a constitution by light of simply ―the general Welfare‖261 
would, contrary to that avowed aim, encourage the pursuit of private 
advantage. Where we cannot agree on the meaning of a constitutional 
term, after all, each of us will tend to favor a more marginally self-
serving one. Interpretive uncertainty engenders partisan conflict, 
eroding the rule of law. To best serve the public good, therefore, we 
must read the Constitution subject to the constraints of a particular 
interpretive method, rather than merely according to good intentions, 
and furthermore a method chosen not because it generates any 
particular, favorite result, but rather because it in general tends to 
resolve disputes in a justifiable manner. 
Popular interpretive theories such as originalism or living 
constitutionalism can certainly lay better claim to resolving disputes 
than the pursuit of private advantage or the unvarnished public good 
can. I do not plan here to exhaustively critique the virtues of those 
theories, which at least offer us more than nothing. Here, rather, I 
offer an outline of an alternative approach to constitutional decision 
making, one that aims to maximize the justifiability of the 
Constitution with regard to those whom it would bind. Such a 
consensualist theory aims, in other words, to interpret and construct a 
constitution so as to respect the consent of the governed. 
As discussed above, an expressly consensual transaction between 
fully informed and equally powerful parties sets the gold standard for 
consent. We cannot expect any political constitution to meet that 
standard, of course.
262
 We can, however, interpret and construct a 
constitution to encourage forms of government that converge on that 
ideal. Thus, for instance, we should generally favor reading a 
constitution to allow freedom of exit from the constitution‘s 
jurisdiction.
263
 
More generally, a consensualist approach would tend to subject a 
constitution to the same demands the law generally imposes on only 
weakly justified agreements. On that view, argues Ethan J. Leib, we 
should adopt the following principles of constitutional interpretation 
and construction: 
                                                                                                                 
261 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
262 See supra Part III.B (discussing the problem of justifying political coercion). 
263 See supra Part III.B.3.a. 
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(1) investigate the type of assent we can justifiably ascribe to 
citizens; (2) enforce bits of text that are plain, 
uncontroversial, and particularly clear; (3) construe 
ambiguous phrases against the ―drafter‖ and in favor of those 
who are assenting today; (4) protect the kinds of inalienable 
rights that the contractual document must be read to 
respect . . . ; (5) protect the reasonable expectations of today‘s 
signatories; and (6) assess whether the document and its 
potential applications accord with fundamental fairness.
264
 
To those strictures, contract law suggests we might add this one: 
given the gross irregularities that plague a constitution‘s adoption and 
enforcement, it should not take much substantive unconscionability to 
justify striking a provision as void and unenforceable.
265
 Courts place 
procedural and substantive flaws on the same side of the scale when 
judging an agreement‘s unconscionability, after all; strong proofs of 
one can offset weak proofs of the other.
266
 
To the text not winnowed out as unconscionable, we should assign 
a plain meaning consistent with the understanding of all 
contemporary parties to the constitution, politicians and citizens alike. 
If we can find no common meaning, we should assign the text its 
plain public meaning, because we can impute to political actors 
knowledge of what citizens think about the constitution‘s meaning.267 
As agents of the public, politicians owe a fiduciary obligation to 
understand and implement the preferences of those in whose name 
they claim to act.
268
 Thus, a politician who adopts or enforces a 
constitution, without regard to the meaning ascribed to it by the 
citizens—who are supposedly bound by the constitution—would 
thereby breach not only his fiduciary obligations, but the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing incumbent on every party to a contract.
269
 Such 
                                                                                                                 
264 Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 353, 368 (2008) (footnote omitted). As discussed below, infra note 296, Professor 
Leib perhaps does his theory a disservice by classifying it as a variant of living 
constitutionalism, given that it generates results so different from those that have so often issued 
under that banner). 
265 Indeed, one might well argue that, because federal courts claim the sole authority to 
judge the constitutionality of federal law, the Constitution describes an inherently 
unconscionable bargain, wherein one of the parties claims to act as its own judge. See supra Part 
III.B.3.c (describing the nature of that problem and a possible cure). 
266 See supra Part II.B (evaluating the justificatory force of different types of consent). 
267 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(2) (1981) (specifying which 
meaning prevails when the parties attach different meanings to an agreement and one of them 
knows or should know of the other‘s understanding). 
268 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958) (defining fiduciary 
obligations of agent to principal). 
269 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (―Every contract imposes 
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wayward political agents could not rightfully command our 
obedience. We must therefore interpret the enforceable terms of a 
constitution consistent with the plain meaning ascribed to them by 
those subjected to the constitution‘s jurisdiction. 
Uncertainty will remain, of course; words do not always have plain 
meanings, and context does not always clarify. We then turn from 
interpretation to construction.
270
 Even then, though, we should favor 
the meaning most likely to advantage the parties subjected to a 
constitution‘s jurisdiction—those whom it claims to govern, in other 
words. After all, a constitution represents the ultimate in standard 
form agreements, offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to 
comparatively powerless offerees. 
Other tools of construction might also help to resolve vagueness. A 
court might, for instance, look to prior performances between the 
parties to the constitutional agreement
271—legal precedents, in 
particular. Next, it might look to other dealings between the same 
parties, such as statutes passed under authority of the constitution.
272
 
And, should those devices fail to decipher the constitution‘s text, a 
court might refer to customary practices, such as common-law 
rights
273
 and international law.
274
 Those supplementary tools for 
constructing a constitution would, however, come into play only after 
a court has done all it can to protect the rights of any citizen or 
resident subjected to the constitution‘s standardized terms. The one-
                                                                                                                 
 
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.‖). 
270 For an explanation of the distinction between interpretation and construction, see 
Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 063: Interpretation and Construction, LEGAL 
THEORY LEXICON, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2008/04/legal-theory-
le.html (last updated May 16, 2010). 
271 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(4) (―[A]ny course of 
performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given great weight in the 
interpretation of the agreement.‖). But see id. § 203(b) (―[E]xpress terms are given greater 
weight than course of performance . . . .‖); see also U.C.C. §1-205(4) (2004) (prior) (―[T]he 
express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of dealing or usage of trade shall be 
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but when such construction is 
unreasonable . . . express terms control . . . .‖). 
272 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(b) (―[E]xpress terms are 
given greater weight than course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade, course 
of performance is given greater weight than course of dealing or usage of trade, and course of 
dealing is given greater weight than usage of trade.‖). 
273 A like presumption already applies in questions of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., 
United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (―‗[S]tatutes which invade the common 
law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar 
principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.‘‖ (omission in original) 
(quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952))). 
274 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (referencing international 
legal sources in support of holding unconstitutional the execution of mentally retarded 
criminals). 
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way nature of the constitutional bargain demands a very critical 
scrutiny of government power. 
In those respects, a consensualist theory largely resembles other 
prominent theories of constitutional decision making. Both 
originalists and advocates of a living constitution voice great regard 
for individual rights, for instance,
275
 and claim to resort to their 
favored supplementary devices only when the plain meaning of the 
text proves elusive.
276
 But a consensualist approach would place far 
greater weight on the plain public meaning of constitutional terms 
than prevailing methods of interpretation seem willing to admit. No 
court reading a standard form agreement that grants the offeror 
authority to regulate only ―interstate commerce‖ would understand it 
to limit the right of a comparatively powerless offeree to grow 
wheat
277
 or marijuana
278
 for personal consumption, for instance. Nor, 
therefore, should a court that aims to respect the consent of the 
governed read the constitution‘s text any differently. 
A consensualist theory would also differ from currently prevailing 
theories by focusing on the contemporary public meaning of the 
constitution‘s text, rather than on the public meaning ascribed to the 
text at the time of its ratification or the contemporary meaning 
ascribed to the text by latter-day judges. If we aim to respect the 
consent of the governed, after all, we care what they think when they 
read the plain text of the constitution—not what people long dead 
originally thought about that text, nor what judges and legal 
commentators now think. 
An originalist might counter that viewing the constitution as a 
contract should in fact compel us to consider the opinions of those 
who ratified it, long dead though they may be, as binding on 
contemporary citizens. As Judge Frank H. Easterbrook observes: ―If I 
buy a house with borrowed money, the net value of the house is what 
my heirs inherit; they can‘t get the house free from the debt. This is so 
whether my heirs consent to the deal or not; contract rights pass to the 
                                                                                                                 
275 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (citing the original 
understanding of the Second Amendment in support of an individual right to keep and bear 
arms); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (citing recent developments in medical technology, 
changing social mores, and developments in the case law in support of a right to abortion). 
276 See, e.g., Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791–97 (citing both contemporary and, when that 
generates indeterminate results, historic meaning of ―to keep and bear arms‖ in order to clarify 
the meaning of the Second Amendment); Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (prefacing the argument for a 
constitutional right to privacy emanating from penumbras of Bill of Rights with: ―The 
Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy‖). 
277 But see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (finding ―interstate commerce‖ to 
encompass growing wheat for private consumption). 
278 But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (finding ―interstate commerce‖ to 
encompass growing marijuana for private consumption). 
 12/23/2010 10:52:26 AM 
2010] GRADUATED CONSENT IN CONTRACT AND TORT LAW 77 
next generation as written.‖279 Easterbrook‘s analogy suggests that 
citizenship comes attached to a constitutional covenant, one created 
many generations ago that ―runs with the nation,‖ we might say. 
That analogy shows only that while you may adopt a contract 
initially formed between others, it does not establish that we should 
read the contract to bind you to the understanding of those original 
parties. Suppose, for instance, that you purchased land bound by a 
covenant, originally formed in 1789 between other parties, allowing 
the use of ―outdoor lighting‖ on the property. Today, thanks to 
technological advances, that term effectively means something quite 
different from what it once did. What covenant did you agree to? One 
that permits only rustic torches in your backyard or one that lets you 
install energy-efficient LEDs? 
That nice puzzle of contract law appears so obscure and unlikely 
as to have escaped much judicial attention. Evidence that parties in 
like cases have seen fit to spell out that original meaning controls 
suggests that courts should, as a customary default rule, favor the 
meaning of the late-agreeing party.
280
 Sound theory suggests likewise. 
We must choose to favor one reading over another, after all—the 
objective meaning of the parties at the time of the contract‘s initial 
formation or the meaning of the parties who later join the agreement. 
Time erodes meaning, poisoning it with error. Simple efficiency tells 
us to favor the meaning that we can find most quickly, easily, and 
accurately. That test favors using the present public meaning of the 
late-joining party. 
Equity offers the same answer, adding the caveat that we must not 
work an injustice on other, older parties to the contract. Those parties 
can easily change the default, however, as part of the transaction by 
which the new party joins the extant agreement. An extant party‘s 
offer could, for instance, say, ―The parties attribute to this agreement 
its public meaning at the time of its first formation.‖281 Private parties 
already evidently solve the problem that way after all. But the 
Constitution contains no such clause. Evidence suggests, morover, 
                                                                                                                 
279 Frank H. Easterbrook, Pragmatism’s Role in Interpretation, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL‘Y 901, 905 (2008). 
280 See Trostel v. Am. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 168 F.3d 1105, 1107 (1999) (noting that the 
parties stipulated that a tenant taking over the lease in 1990, ―‗accepts, assumes and agrees to be 
bound by all of the terms and conditions to be kept, observed and performed by the lessee in 
[the 1917 lease].‘‖ (alteration in original) (quoting Trostel v. Am. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 
736, 739 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded by Am. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Trostel, 519 
U.S. 1104 (1997))). 
281 See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 885, 912 (1985) (reviewing the public debate at the time of the Constitution‘s 
proposed ratification about how the document should be interpreted and concluding that ―there 
were sharp disagreements over which interpretive approach was acceptable‖ (footnote omitted)). 
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that no clause binding the Constitution's meaning to one era would 
have won ratification in eighteenth-century post-Colonial America.
282
 
Easterbrook‘s example, however accurate a description of the legal 
impact of inheriting mortgaged property, thus falls far short of 
justifying originalism. For one thing, it focuses on a problem of estate 
law, and describes a transaction in which the present-day grantee has 
no say. In fact, however, consent plays a vital role in such 
transactions. In free societies, debts cannot be forced on heirs, for to 
hold otherwise would in effect allow human bondage.
283
 In our law, 
therefore, an heir unhappy with the net assets of an estate can freely 
disclaim it, thereby escaping the debts of the deceased.
284
 
That does not quite tell us whose meaning we should adopt when 
interpreting a contract that one party, having already entered into the 
same agreement with others, offers to another, new party. 
Easterbrook‘s example concerns estate law, after all. It does helpfully 
remind us, though, that contract terms cannot be forced on a party 
against that party‘s consent. The law can and does force people to act 
in certain ways, of course. But we cannot grace those legal 
mechanisms with the label ―contract‖—at least not without 
disfiguring the meaning of the word. 
1. Questions for Originalists 
Because contract law respects mutual consent, our best rules for 
interpreting and constructing a constitution come from our rules for 
interpreting and constructing contracts. In that way, we might 
maximize the justifiability of the constitution‘s enforcement on those 
subjected to its jurisdiction. How could we justify an approach that 
fails to pay as much respect to the consent of the governed? Not 
easily.
285
 
                                                                                                                 
282 See Trostel, 168 F.3d at 1107. 
283 See Smita Narula, Overlooked Danger: The Security and Rights Implications of Hindu 
Nationalism in India, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 41, 65–66 n.97 (2003) (describing mechanism in 
southeast Asian countries by which children ―inherit their families‘ debts and remain trapped in 
a cycle of debt bondage‖). 
284 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1105(a) (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 190 (Supp. 2010) (―A 
person may disclaim, in whole or part, any interest in or power over property . . . .‖); see also 
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 
§ 170 (rev. 2d ed. 1979) (―Under common law, when a beneficiary received notice of the 
creation of a trust for his benefit, he had a reasonable time to decide whether to accept the 
equitable interest under the trust or to disclaim or renounce it and thus prevent the interest from 
vesting in or passing to him. . . . [This] power has now been adopted by statute in most states.‖ 
(footnotes omitted)). 
285 Those who join in such a conspiracy to neglect or abuse the consent of the governed 
might, of course, regard the constitution as more justified when read with a self-serving slant. 
That would at most make their preferred interpretative method justified among their fellow 
thieves, however; it would not suffice to establish the consent of their victims. 
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Perhaps originalists can justify their favored mode of 
constitutional interpretation as the same approach that a court would 
take if tasked to interpret an agreement between, on the one hand, a 
young adult and, on the other hand, an awesomely powerful unnatural 
person, unliving and yet undead, that claims the sole right to initiate 
coercion, that offers the bargain on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and that 
acts as its own judge when challenged. Perhaps originalists would, in 
such a case, disfavor the present public meaning that a contemporary 
offeree would reasonably assume controls the one-sided standard 
form agreement, instead favoring a meaning that the offeror adopted 
some two hundred years before, or perhaps not. 
Regardless, original meaning would remain vital to constitutional 
interpretation. For one thing, the meanings of words change very 
slowly. In practice, originalism will almost always offer the same 
meaning as an interpretive method that places the consent of the 
governed foremost. For another, even originalists support stepping far 
back from the text when interpretation runs out and construction 
begins, as when confronting a question the Founders never had 
occasion to consider.
286
 
In further defense of originalism, it bears emphasizing that the 
public debates that surrounded such constitutional events as the 
ratification of the U.S. Constitution or the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provide serious and detailed discussions by partisans, 
experts, and citizens. The first people asked to consent to 
constitutional terms have powerful incentives to think long and hard 
about what those words mean to them, as well as what those words 
might mean when applied years hence. The Founders thus took care 
to deliberate, and vote, with an eye to protecting their posterity.
287
 
As John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport observe, the 
supermajorities required to adopt or amend the U.S. Constitution have 
helped to ensure its ―beneficence.‖288 On their view, original-meaning 
jurisprudence generates not only good results but, since the 
                                                                                                                 
286 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 145 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (affirming his belief that the Eighth Amendment is an 
abstract principle, explaining, ―If I did not hold this belief, I would not be able to apply the 
Eighth Amendment (as I assuredly do) to all sorts of tortures quite unknown at the time the 
Eighth Amendment was adopted‖). Query whether Justice Scalia would uphold the 
constitutionality of a punishment, such as tarring and feathering, which the Founding era 
evidently thought appropriate but that many today would regard as cruel and unusual.  
287 And, sometimes, posteriors. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, The Third Amendment: Forgotten 
But Not Gone, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 117 (1993) (reviewing evidence that federal 
lawmakers deliberately, but covertly, narrowed the scope of the Third Amendment during their 
congressional deliberations). 
288 John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 31 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 917, 925 (2008). 
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Constitution aims to ―promote the general welfare,‖ helps to render 
the Constitution more justified.
289
 That defense of originalism comes 
with a twist, however; the authors require modern-day courts to adopt 
interpretative rules from the Founding era.
290
 Their form of 
originalism comes with caveat, too; it must give way if another 
approach ―is more likely to reach consequences that are as sound as 
the consequences reached by originalism.‖291 
It thus remains unclear what McGinnis and Rappaport would say 
about interpreting the Constitution—or at least those of its provisions 
that directly impact citizens—as modern courts would interpret a 
standard form agreement between unequals, offered on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis, backed with only weak proofs of consent. We cannot 
very well know exactly what interpretive rules Founding-era courts 
would have applied to that, a transaction characteristic of the modern 
commercial age. Perhaps they would have regarded such supposed 
agreements as unenforceable insults to freedom; the spirit of the then-
recent Revolution of 1776 certainly suggests as much.
292
 
At any rate, though, we have no reason to think that the Founding 
generation would have objected to the methods of interpretation and 
construction that a modern court would typically apply before 
enforcing any weakly justified standard form agreement between 
extant and new parties. All courts would favor reading the contract so 
as to best safeguard the consent of those relatively powerless 
latecomers from whom the older, more powerful party has asked 
submission. That approach would moreover have the commendable 
pragmatic result of protecting natural, common-law, and 
constitutional rights—probably more so than originalism does.293 
Granted, a consensualist approach to constitutional decision making 
might upset a few apple carts; some longstanding Supreme Court 
opinions would probably fall by the wayside, for instance. In the long 
run, though, applying the time-tested methods of contract law to 
                                                                                                                 
289 See id. at 920 (―[I]t is the supermajoritarian genesis of the Constitution that explains 
both why the Constitution is desirable and why that desirability depends on its original 
meaning.‖). 
290 Id. at 926. 
291 Id. at 928. 
292 The revolutionaries complained, for instance, that the King of England ―has made 
Judges dependent on his Will alone,‖ THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 
1776), ―impos[ed] Taxes on us without our Consent,‖ id. para. 19, and answered humble 
petitions ―only by repeated injury,‖ id. para. 30.  
293 As McGinnis and Rappaport observe, the original Constitution had a flawed view of the 
rights of slaves and women, which later amendments have corrected. McGinnins & Rappaport, 
supra note 288, at 932–35. Query, though, whether we can completely exonerate Founding-era 
interpretive rules for suffering those wrongs to survive judicial review.  
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constitutional problems promises to generate efficient, equitable, and 
consistent results. 
2. Questions for Living Constitutionalists 
Just as it differs from originalism in some regards, so too would a 
consensualist approach to interpretation and construction differ from 
one that vests judges with wide latitude to adapt the Constitution to 
modern times. That, a so-called living-Constitution mode of decision 
making, emphasizes flexible meanings and respect for judicial 
precedent.
294
 Under living constitutionalism, ―the best interpretation 
of the Constitution‘s meaning changes in accordance with changing 
circumstances and events, and . . . it is the duty of all actors, including 
judges, to change their interpretations of the Constitution to reflect 
these changing circumstances.‖295 
A consensualist approach, in contrast, reads the Constitution in a 
manner calculated to maximize the consent of the governed, viewing 
the Constitution as a standard form agreement between unequals, 
offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and supported by only weak and 
controvertible proofs of assent. A consensualist starts, and often 
finishes, with the plain present public meaning of the text.
296
 That 
meaning would certainly trump judicial rulings to the contrary, which 
at best offer only evidence of prior performances by the same parties 
under the same agreement.
297
 
                                                                                                                 
294 See Scott Dodson, A Darwinist View of the Living Constitution, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
1319, 1322–25 (2008) (collecting and reviewing authorities). 
295 Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional 
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 698 (2005). Balkin adds, perceptively, ―Not surprisingly, 
living constitutionalism is a controversial theory, which, since the New Deal, has proved much 
more acceptable to liberals than to conservatives.‖ Id. at 699. 
296 Ethan J. Leib takes a similar view of the constitution and yet describes the interpretative 
methodology that results as ―one variant‖ of ―living constitutionalism.‖ Leib, supra note 264, at 
355. That label perhaps risks obscuring the virtues of regarding the Constitution as a contract 
between the federal government and present-day citizens, however, for such an approach avoids 
the ―messiness, seeming lack of discipline, purported lack of fidelity (and actual lack of faith 
from time to time), disrespect for the document, and too substantial delegation to the judiciary‖ 
that make ―living constitutionalism . . . unattractive to so many.‖ Id. at 362. 
297 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(b) (1981) (ranking those tools 
in like fashion); U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (2004) (prior) (ranking express terms, course of dealing, and 
usage of trade in like fashion); id. § 2-208(2) (placing course of performance into the ranking 
between express terms and course of dealing). In practice, given that the judicial system far 
outlives individual citizens, precedents typically offer even weaker proofs of the consent of the 
(presently) governed: prior performances by different parties under an agreement having the 
same terms. Although neither the U.C.C. nor the Restatement (Second) of Contracts specify 
exactly where that sort of evidence would fall in their ordinal rankings of interpretative tools, 
logic suggests that courts should regard it as less probative than course of performance, at least, 
and perhaps less probative that course of dealing. 
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Are living constitutionalists willing to give up such cases as Kelo 
v. City of New London,
298
 in which the Supreme Court held that a 
forced transfer from one private party to another qualified as a ―public 
use‖ under the Fifth Amendment; Home Building & Loan Association 
v. Blaisdell,
299 which effectively gutted the Constitution‘s mandate 
that states pass no law ―impairing the Obligation of Contracts;‖300 or 
Gonzales v. Raich,
301
 which read the power to ―regulate purely 
intrastate activity that is not itself ‗commercial‘‖302 into text allowing 
Congress only to ―regulate Commerce . . . among the several 
States‖?303 It would seem hard to countenance those and other judicial 
deviations from the Constitution‘s plain, present, public meaning. In 
those and other cases, the living Constitution would part ways with 
the consensual one. 
Because it aims to maximize the consent of parties subject to the 
Constitution‘s jurisdiction here and now, rather than as of some 200 
years ago, consensualist constitutionalism does share with living 
constitutionalism a concern for the present. The latter apparently 
trusts federal agents to decide questions of the Constitution‘s 
meaning, however. A consensualist reading, in contrast, focuses on 
what living citizens and residents of the United States think the 
Constitution means. Maximizing the consent of the governed also 
calls for something better than entrusting federal agents with the sole 
authority to issue binding constitutional opinions; it calls, rather for 
empowering citizens to choose less partial judges of the proper scope 
of government power.
304
 
Living constitutionalists might regard that prospect with horror, 
granted. For that matter, originalists might, too.
305
 But somebody has 
                                                                                                                 
298 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
299 290 U.S. 398 (1934). ―The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its 
continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts,‖ the 
majority opined. Id. at 437. Astonishingly, however, it nowhere saw fit to quote the 
Constitution‘s plain language on the subject. 
300 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
301 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
302 Id. at 18 (2005). 
303 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
304 See supra Part III.B.3.c (discussing the creation of citizen courts). 
305 Randy Barnett, a leading proponent of original meaning jurisprudence, explains that 
―the principal reason for adhering to original meaning is that we the living, right here, right 
now, profess a commitment to a written constitution. And the function of a written constitution 
would be seriously compromised if its meaning can be altered by the will of judges or 
legislators.‖ Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Clichés, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 493, 506 (2008) 
(emphasis in the original; footnote omitted). But originalism does not tell us who now should 
decide what the Constitution meant long ago. The problem of self-interested judges remains. 
On that count, an originalist might find something useful in the consensualist approach. As 
Barnett says, ―[T]he meaning of a written constitution should remain the same until it is 
properly changed, and judges and legislators have no power under our system to change its 
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to decide what the Constitution means. Why not choose someone 
likely to maximize the consent of the governed? 
CONCLUSION 
This Article argued, in a nutshell, that consent varies by degrees 
and provides a standard for evaluating the justification of social 
institutions. Evidence for that claim pervades legal, moral, and 
economic reasoning. After verbally and graphically illustrating 
graduated-consent theory, the Article applied it to several 
longstanding puzzles, generating fresh insights into the enforceability 
of standard form agreements, the justifiability of political institutions, 
and the meaning of the Constitution. 
For all that, graduated-consent theory offers room for further 
development. The relationship between the nature of transactions—
their consensuality—and the subjects of transactions—their res—
remains undeveloped. Exploring that new area will call not just for a 
close examination of contract and tort law, the primary concerns here, 
but also of property law. 
The prospect of applying economic reasoning to non-expressly 
consensual transactions also holds great, and as yet almost untapped, 
promise. This Article has offered only some preliminary comments 
about a consensualist approach to reading a constitution, for instance. 
And, yet, despite Judge Frank Easterbrook‘s claim that ―it is 
important to separate the theory of political justification from the 
theory of interpretation appropriate to that theory of justification,‖306 
we have much to gain by crafting a theory of constitutional meaning 
that flows directly from our theory of constitutional justification. 
With the reader‘s leave, however, I will set aside fuller exploration of 
that and other applications of graduated-consent theory for another 
day. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
meaning.‖ Id. at 506–07 (emphasis in the original; footnote omitted). I would add only that we 
should recognize evolution in the present, public, plain meaning of its text as a proper way that 
the meaning of the Constitution might change—and that we should settle that question of fact 
via a mechanism that maximizes the Constitution‘s justifiability. 
306 Easterbrook, supra note 279, at 905. 
